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INTRODUCTION
This article argues that charitable trusts that discriminate on the ba-
sis of race or sex are invalid and should not be enforced. It reaches this
t Professor of Law, DePaul University College of Law.
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conclusion on two grounds. First, courts and public officials are so
deeply involved with the administration of all charitable trusts that there
is enough state involvement in discriminatory charitable trusts that they
violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Sec-
ond, discriminatory trusts are contrary to public policy and should not be
enforced under traditional trust law.
Courts have traditionally viewed charitable trusts as private arrange-
ments that may discriminate on the basis of race, sex, or other character-
istics, provided that public officials are not trustees.' Courts have held
that charitable trusts administered by private parties are valid and do not
violate the Equal Protection Clause.2 Additionally, the courts generally
have refused to invalidate discriminatory charitable trusts on public pol-
icy grounds. 3
But the law is changing. Recent cases have refused to enforce dis-
criminatory charitable trusts, although the reasoning of these cases is
strained or nonexistent. The trend toward the denial of enforcement of
discriminatory trusts is fitful, sporadic, uncoordinated, and
unacknowledged.
This article contends that the law is in a transition from generally
upholding discriminatory charitable trusts that have no direct state ad-
ministration to generally invalidating discriminatory charitable trusts, re-
gardless of whether state officials have a direct role in their
administration. It asserts that this transition represents the correct con-
clusion arrived at from the premises of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment and the public purpose doctrine of state charita-
ble trust law.
The current inclination of courts not to enforce discriminatory trusts
has led to inconsistencies. Although the recent cases do not specifically
hold that all racially discriminatory trusts are invalid, no court has upheld
a racially discriminatory trust since 1975. 4 There is little reasoning in
these cases, but recent cases are consistent in denying enforcement. Sex-
ually discriminatory charitable trusts, on the other hand, have come
under attack in recent years, but the results have been mixed. With some
exceptions, sexually discriminatory trusts have been upheld. Even
though intellectual consistency requires charitable trusts that discriminate
I In re Estate of Wilson, 452 N.E.2d 1228 (N.Y. 1983); First Nat'l Bank v. Danforth,
523 S.W.2d 808 (Mo. 1975), cert. denied sub nom. Lakeside Hosp. Ass'n. v. First Nat'l Bank,
421 U.S. 1016 (1975).
2 See infra note 3 and accompanying text. Trusts that are administered by public offi-
cials, however, may not discriminate on the basis of race or sex. See infra Part I.C.1.
3 See infra Part II.B.
4 The last cases to uphold discriminatory trusts are First Nat'l Bank v. Danforth, 523
S.W.2d 808 (Mo. 1975), cert. denied sub nom. Sutt v. First Nat'l Bank, 421 U.S. 992 (1975),
and Lakeside Hosp. Ass'n v. First Nat'l Bank, 421 U.S. 1016 (1975).
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on gender to be treated the same as racially discriminatory trusts, they
have not been. The cases refusing to enforce both varieties of discrimi-
natory charitable trusts are correct, even if their reasoning is disingenu-
ous or nonexistent. This article contends that there are separate
constitutional and common law trust doctrines that provide an intellec-
tual basis for the invalidation of discriminatory trusts. 5
I. THE CURRENT LAW
A. RACIALLY DISCRIMINATORY CHARITABLE TRUSTS
There are two kinds of racially discriminatory trusts: those that have
public officials directly involved in their administration as trustees and
those that do not. The case law is consistent in holding that direct ad-
ministration of discriminatory trusts by public officials is state action that
violates the Fourteenth Amendment. 6 In the case of racially discrimina-
tory charitable trusts that are administered by public officials, either the
public officials or the discriminatory provisions must be removed in or-
der for the trust to be valid. The law on this is clear.
The validity of racially discriminatory charitable trusts that are not
administered by public officials is much less clear. Although some cases
give lip service to the idea that there is no constitutional problem in the
operation of these trusts, 7 every reported case decided in the past twenty-
five years has refused to enforce the racially discriminatory requirement.
Courts, litigants, and attorneys general seem quite unwilling both to en-
force racially discriminatory trusts and to admit that the law prohibits
them from enforcing them. The courts now uniformly refuse to enforce
these trusts, but no court has directly declared that these trusts are unen-
forceable. The time has come for courts to declare that racially discrimi-
natory charitable trusts are not enforceable.
The change in the law from allowing the enforcement of racially
discriminatory trusts to refusing enforcement has not come with a single
5 Steven R. Swanson argues that legislation prohibiting discrimination in trusts would
also be a solution to the problem of discriminatory trusts. Steven R. Swanson, Discriminatory
Charitable Trusts: Time for a Legislative Solution, 48 U. Prrr. L. REv. 153 (1986). In his
1986 article, Swanson outlines a possible legislative solution based on the assumption that
"traditional trust law and the Fourteenth Amendment provide inadequate solutions." Id. at
157. Despite the logic of Swanson's suggestions, legislatures have shown little interest in
enacting statutes that prohibit discrimination. In any event, as time goes on, there is reason to
be more optimistic that the courts will eventually prohibit race and sex discrimination in chari-
table trusts without the help of statutes. But see Home for Incurables of Bait. City v. Univ. of
Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 797 A.2d 746 (Md. 2002).
6 This result is required by the Supreme Court decisions in Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S.
296 (1966); In re Girard Coll. Trusteeship, 138 A.2d 844 (Pa. 1958), cert. denied, 357 U.S.
570 (1958); and Pennsylvania v. Bd. of Dirs. of City Trusts, 353 U.S. 989 (1957).
7 See, e.g., Wooten v. Fitz-Gerald, 440 S.W.2d 719 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969); In re Will of
Potter, 275 A.2d 574 (Del. Ch. 1970).
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landmark case or series of cases. Rather, it has come in a series of cases
that refuse to enforce racially restrictive charitable trusts for a variety of
stated or unstated reasons. The reasoning of the cases is varied, inconsis-
tent, and sometimes nonexistent, but the results are consistent. Given the
steady rejection of racially discriminatory trusts, a court could simply
declare that all racially restrictive charitable trusts are unenforceable
under current law.
The law concerning racially discriminatory charitable trusts has
been profoundly influenced by two series of cases, both involving chari-
table entities with substantial public involvement. In the first series of
cases, the Girard College cases, an institution was established to provide
for the training and care of "poor male white orphan children."'8 The
second landmark series of cases, Evans v. Newton9 and Evans v. Abney,' 0
involved a city as trustee operating a park for white people only. The
trusts in both of these situations managed entities that were essentially
public. These cases firmly establish the rule that the direct operation of
discriminatory charitable trusts by public officials violates the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. However, they do not pro-
vide clear answers when public officials do not administer discriminatory
charitable trusts.
The Girard College cases involved a trust established in 1831 for
white, male orphans, naming the city of Philadelphia as trustee." In a
brief opinion, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the refusal to admit non-
white children violated the Fourteenth Amendment. 12 The Court held
that the board that operated Girard College was an agency of the state of
Pennsylvania that was forbidden from engaging in race discrimination.13
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania read the U.S. Supreme Court
decision as not invalidating the trust but merely requiring that private
trustees administer the trust. 14 Accordingly, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court affirmed the orphan's court substitution of private trustees and re-
fused to order the admission of black children.
The final chapter in the Girard College cases came with the deci-
sion of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Pennsylvania v. Brown,'15
holding that there was impermissible state involvement in the Girard
College trust. The court reached the conclusion that "the displacement of
8 In re Girard Coll. Trusteeship, 138 A.2d 844, 855 (Pa. 1958), cert. denied, 357 U.S.
570 (1958).
9 382 U.S. 296 (1966).
10 396 U.S. 435 (1970).
11 See supra note 5.
12 Pennsylvania v. Bd. of Dirs. of City Trusts, 353 U.S. 230 (1957).
13 Id. at 231.
14 See supra note 6.
15 Pennsylvania v. Brown, 392 F.2d 120 (1968).
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the City Board by the Commonwealth's agent and the filling of the
Girard Trusteeships with persons selected by the Commonwealth and
committed to upholding the letter of the will .... pushed the College
right back into its old and ugly unconstitutional position." 16 The state
court's appointment of replacement trustees was also state action under
the reasoning of Shelley v. Kraemer,17 because it involved the state
court's enforcement of race discrimination. Additionally, the court
pointed out that the state had been involved for 127 years in the adminis-
tration of the trust.18
The second landmark series of cases was Evans v. Newton' 9 and
Evans v. Abney.20 These cases involved a testator whose will gave prop-
erty to the city of Macon, Georgia, to be used as a park for white people
only. The city resigned as trustee, and the Georgia court appointed three
individuals as new trustees. The U.S. Supreme Court refused to accept
the proposition that the trust had become private with the resignation of
the city as trustee and, therefore, could continue operation as a private
entity following the will's discriminatory provisions. The park had been
serving a public function for many years. The Court held that there had
been a firmly established tradition of municipal control and service, com-
paring it with a police or fire department. It held that substitution of
private trustees was not sufficient to move "this park from the public to
the private sector. '"21
However, even though the Court held that the facts in Evans v.
Newton violated the Fourteenth Amendment, it stated that "[i]f a testator
wanted to leave a school or center for the use of one race only and in no
way implicated the State in the supervision, control, or management of
that facility, we assume arguendo that no constitutional difficulty would
be encountered. '22 This litigation ended with U.S. Supreme Court deci-
sion in Evans v. Abney. 23 The Court affirmed the decisions of the Geor-
gia courts that the trust had failed and that the property should revert to
16 Id. at 125.
17 334 U.S. 1 (1948). See infra Part lI.D. for discussion of the application of Shelly to
discriminatory trusts.
18 Brown, 392 F.2d at 124.
19 382 U.S. 296 (1966).
20 396 U.S. 435 (1969).
21 Newton, 382 U.S. at 301.
22 Id. at 300. See also In re Will of Potter, 275 A.2d 574 (Del. Ch. 1970). In Potter, the
court stated:
There seems to be no doubt, however, but that as a matter of state trust law, a testator
or trustor may cause the creation of a private trust for the benefit of one race just so
long as the state does not become so involved in the affairs of such a legal entity as
to run afoul of the constitutional guarantees of the [E]qual [P]rotection [C]lause of
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
Id. at 579.
23 396 U.S. 435.
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the heirs of the testator.24 The Court also affirmed the Georgia court's
refusal to reform the trust and eliminate the racial restrictions by use of
the cy pres doctrine. 25 The final result was destruction of the charitable
trust and reversion of the property to private ownership.26
Evans v. Newton and the Girard College cases provide clear gui-
dance in some situations but leave others unresolved. They have firmly
established that it is unconstitutional for public officials to administer
discriminatory trusts.27 In contrast to Evans v. Abney, however, most
cases allow the trust to continue in existence, either removing the public
officials from trust administration or removing the discriminatory provi-
sions from the trust.
However, both of these situations involved entities that were largely
public in character. The orphanage in the Girard College cases had been
run as a public institution for more than a century. The park in Evans v.
Newton had been run by the city of Macon as a public park for many
years. The cases provide little guidance when the charitable trust does
not have an openly public nature or public officials administering it. For
example, a typical problem trust has a private person or institution as
trustee of a trust that is to provide scholarships for white students only.
Such a trust does not have the public nature of the entities or the public
administration that were involved in Evans v. Newton and the Girard
College cases. Accordingly, the Girard College cases and Evans v.
Newton do not provide clear guidance in such cases.
B. RECENT RACE DISCRIMINATION CASES
Traditionally, courts have upheld racially discriminatory charitable
trusts not administered by state officials on the theory that they are pri-
vate arrangements that do not involve state action.28 Provided that gov-
ernment officials are not trustees and do not participate in the
24 Abney, 396 U.S. at 445-47.
25 Abney, 396 U.S. at 447. "The rule of cy-pres is a rule for the construction of instru-
ments in equity, by which the intention of the party is carried out as near as may be, when it
would be impossible or illegal to give it literal effect." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 387 (6th
ed. 1990).
26 Id. at 447-48. While the law represented by these cases appears to have been validly
applied, the result is not a good one. A charitable testator left a substantial piece of property
for the benefit of a large group of people, but the property ended up in the hands of the
testator's heirs. The testator affirmatively decided not to give the property to his family, but
they ended up with it. He made the gift with the intention that the property would be used by a
large segment of the public, but the property ended up benefiting none of the public.
27 Conn. Bank and Trust Co. v. Johnson Mem'l Hosp., 294 A.2d 586 (Conn. Super. Ct.
1972) (applying Evans v. Newton and Girard College in reaching its decision).
28 First Nat'l Bank v. Danforth, 523 S.W.2d 808 (Mo. 1975), cert. denied sub nom.
Lakeside Hosp. Ass'n v. First Nat'l Bank, 421 U.S. 1016 (1975).
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administration of discriminatory trusts, the traditional case law holds that
there is no constitutional or public policy impediment to enforcement.
First National Bank v. Danforth,29 decided in 1975 by the Missouri
Supreme Court, appears to be the last case upholding a racially discrimi-
natory charitable trust. The trust in Danforth provided for the support of
hospital patients "born of white parents in the United States of
America."' 30 The Court directly confronted the argument that the trust
was invalid because it violated the Fourteenth Amendment. It found no
constitutional violation because there was no state action. Although ra-
cially discriminatory trusts have been the subject of litigation in a num-
ber of later cases, none has enforced the trusts, and none has followed
Danforth.31
C. CASES REFUSING TO ENFORCE RACIALLY DISCRIMINATORY
CHARITABLE TRUSTS
Since Danforth, courts have decided a number of cases involving
racially discriminatory charitable trusts. All of these recent cases have
refused to enforce the discriminatory provisions of the trusts, relying on a
variety of legal theories or no theory at all.
1. Trusts Involving Public Officials
A number of cases involve racially discriminatory charitable trusts
that have a public official as trustee or that holds other administrative
power over the trust. The law is clear that these trusts may not be en-
forced. They violate the Equal Protection Clause under the reasoning of
the Girard College cases and Evans v. Newton because they unlawfully
involve the state in discrimination. Faced with these facts, a court has
three possible courses of action. First, it can hold that the trust is com-
pletely void and return the trust assets to the heirs of the settler, as was
done in Evans v. Abney. Second, the court can remove the public offi-
cials from the administration of the trust and allow it to continue as a
private discriminatory charitable trust, but no recent cases have followed
this course. 32 Finally, the court can remove the discriminatory provision
29 Id.
30 Id. at 812. The trust limited the support to patients at "Protestant Christian Hospitals"
in Jackson County, Missouri. Id. The court held that the religious restrictions on the hospitals
that could use the funds did not invalidate the trust. Id. at 820. The term "Protestant Christian
Hospitals" was not ambiguous, and the religious limitations on the hospital beneficiaries did
not violate the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 818, 820-21.
31 Even though no cases have followed Danforth, none has explicitly disavowed its
reasoning.
32 But see In re Estate of Wilson, 452 N.E.2d 1228 (N.Y. 1983) (removing public offi-
cials from the administration of gender discriminatory trusts).
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from the trust and allow it to continue as a non-discriminatory charitable
trust.
The first possible course for a court evaluating a discriminatory trust
administered by public officials is to terminate the trust and transfer the
assets to the creator or the creator's heirs. Such was the case in Connect-
icut Bank and Trust Co. v. Johnson Memorial Hospital.33 In that case,
the court invalidated a trust created to provide medical care for "mem-
bers of the Caucasian race."'34 The court refused to revise the trust to
eliminate the offending state action. Rather, it invalidated the trust and
returned the trust assets to the testator's estate, noting that the will of the
testator provided that the property was to go to the residue of her estate if
operation of the trust violated any law.35 Although terminating the trust
and returning the assets to the testator's estate is often a reasonable alter-
native, courts almost never use it.36
The second course of action when public officials are involved in
the administration of a discriminatory charitable trust is simply to re-
move the public officials from the administration of the trust and allow it
to go forward as a private discriminatory trust without state action. Al-
though this has been done with gender discriminatory trusts, 3 7 no recent
case has followed this course in a racially discriminatory trust. If we
assume, as old cases did, that private discriminatory trusts are valid, re-
moval of the public officials would be completely effective to eliminate
33 294 A.2d 586 (Conn. 1972).
34 Id. at 588.
35 Id. at 593. Many cases have found general charitable intent allowing courts to apply
the cy pres doctrine and remove the discriminatory requirements in charitable trusts. See Dag-
gett v. Children's Ctr., 266 A.2d 72 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1970); Pennsylvania v. Brown, 392 F.2d
120 (3d Cir. 1968); Smith v. Moore, 225 F. Supp. 434 (E.D. Va. 1963), aff'd 343 F.2d 594 (4th
Cir. 1965); Dunbar v. Bd. of Trustees of Clayton Coll., 461 P.2d 28 (Colo. 1969); In re Will of
Potter, 275 A.2d 574 (Del. Ch. 1970); Howard Sav. Inst. v. Peep, 170 A.2d 39 (N.J. 1961); In
re Estate of Hawley, 223 N.Y.S.2d 803 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1961); Wooten v. Fitz-Gerald, 440
S.W.2d 719 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969); Coffee v. Rice Univ., 408 S.W.2d 269 (Tex. Civ. App.
1966); Trammell v. Elliott, 199 S.E.2d 194 (Ga. 1973); Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v.
Buchanan, 346 F. Supp. 665 (D.D.C. 1972).
The court noted in Connecticut Bank and Trust Co. that the cases allowing the trusts to
continue without the discriminatory provisions did not contain a gift over provision as existed
in the trust in question. Conn. Bank & Trust Co., 294 A.2d at 591. But see Home for Incur-
ables of Bait. City v. Univ. of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 797 A.2d 746 (Md. 2002).
36 The court in Conn. Bank and Trust Co. noted only two cases that returned the trust
assets to the testator's estate, Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435 (1970), and La Fond v. Detroit, 98
N.W.2d 530 (Mich. 1959). Conn. Bank & Trust Co., 294 A.2d at 591.
Generally, these cases involve the question of whether the assets should be used for re-
vised charitable purposes or should go to the testator's relatives. In each case, a generous
testator decided to use the property for charitable purposes and not to give the property to
family members. It is not surprising that judges often try to find a way to let the assets be used
for charitable purposes rather than transferring them to distant and perhaps greedy relatives of
the testator.
37 In re Estate of Wilson, 452 N.E.2d at 1237.
DISCRIMINATION IN CHARITABLE TRUSTS
the prohibited state action in racially discriminatory trusts. Courts in re-
cent years seem loath to do it, however. 38 The refusal to remove the state
actors, at least in race discrimination cases, may indicate that courts sim-
ply are not willing to permit the discriminatory trust to continue even
without direct state supervision. 39
The third approach that courts use with respect to racially discrimi-
natory trusts administered by public officials is to eliminate the discrimi-
natory provisions from the trust and allow it to continue to operate.
Elimination of the discriminatory provisions does not eliminate the role
of the state officials. It just makes their function constitutionally accept-
able. Most of these cases hold that the enforcement of the discriminatory
trust is impossible and apply the cy pres doctrine to eliminate the offend-
ing discriminatory provision.40
2. Racially Discriminatory Charitable Trusts Not Administered
by Public Officials
Most discriminatory charitable trusts are not administered by public
officials. The issues raised by these trusts are more difficult, and the
courts' reasoning with respect to their validity is not consistent. As with
racially discriminatory trusts administered by state officials, recent deci-
sions refuse to enforce the racial provisions. Some refuse enforcement
on vaguely stated public policy or changed circumstances grounds. A
few directly address the constitutional problems of judicial enforcement
of these trusts. Other courts simply assume that the trusts are not en-
forceable and proceed on that basis.
A few cases eliminate racial restrictions from trusts by use of the cy
pres doctrine on the theory that it is impossible or impractical to operate
the trust with the racial restrictions. For example, in Coffee v. Rice Uni-
38 The thesis of this article is that the conclusions in cases that refuse to enforce discrimi-
natory trusts are correct and that there are legal justifications for these conclusions. But rather
than directly holding that racially discriminatory charitable trusts are not valid, the courts find
ways to remove the offending provisions of the trusts. These decisions give the impression
that the judges are simply unwilling to sanction racial discrimination and grasp any tool at
hand to avoid continuation of a racially discriminatory trust.
39 But see In re Estate of Wilson, 452 N.E.2d at 1232 (N.Y. 1983).
40 See Trammell, 199 S.E.2d at 199. In this case, the trust created scholarships for white
students at a state university. Id. at 197. The involvement of the university was impermissible
state action. Id. Removal of the discriminatory provision by use of the cy pres doctrine elimi-
nated the problem. Id. at 198-99. In order to apply cy pres, the court had to determine that the
operation of the charitable trust without the discriminatory trust was consistent with the gen-
eral charitable intent of the testator. Id. See also In re Will of Potter, 275 A.2d 574; Wachovia
Bank & Trust Co., 346 F.Supp. 665; Colin McK. Grant Home v. Medlock, 349 S.E.2d 655
(S.C. Ct. App. 1986). But see Hermitage Methodist Homes of Va., Inc. v. Dominion Trust
Co., 387 S.E.2d 740 (Va. 1990) (refusing'to apply cy pres).
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versity,4' the Court of Civil Appeals of Texas upheld a jury verdict al-
lowing the trustees of Rice University to deviate from its founding
document and admit nonwhite students. 42 According to the court, it was
impossible or impractical for a university to discriminate racially.43 The
race discrimination, according to this court, would interfere with recruit-
ment of faculty and limit research and the acquisition of grants. 44 The
result of this case is reasonable, but its expressed reasoning is weak. Op-
eration of a racially discriminatory university would not be impossible or
impractical. 45 It would be merely embarrassing and inconvenient. This
decision would have been more persuasive if the court had held that
trusts that racially discriminate are simply unacceptable in quasi-public
institutions such as universities.
Other cases reform trusts to eliminate racial limitations without
clearly explaining the justifications for their conclusions. For example,
Grant Home v. Medlock46 involved a home established "for Elderly
white Presbyterians of Charleston, South Carolina," to be built at a par-
ticular location. 47 The heirs of the testator asserted that the trust should
be dissolved and the assets distributed to them because of the racial re-
striction and because the specified location of the home was no longer
practical. 48 The trustees had agreed that the racial restriction was invalid
but wanted the trust to continue without the racial restriction and with the
home in another location. The Court of Appeals of South Carolina elimi-
nated the racial restriction and allowed the trust to continue to function.
The court simply stated that society has changed with respect to race
relations and referred to the fact that discrimination in housing is illegal.
It may be that the court and all of the parties in this case realized that the
law has, in effect, changed to prohibit enforcement of racially discrimi-
natory trusts even though there is no definitive authority requiring this
result.
41 408 S.W.2d 269, 287 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966). See also Estate of Vanderhoofven v.
Biechner, 18 Cal. App. 3d 940, 948 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971) (implying that cy pres should be
applied to eliminate the requirement that assets be used only for a "white" engineering school);
Home for Incurables of Bait. City v. Univ. of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 797 A.2d 746, 754 (Md.
2002).
42 Coffee, 408 S.W.2d at 287.
43 Id.
44 Id. at 286.
45 See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 580-81 (1983). In Bob Jones
University, the university was quite willing and able to continue operation as a racially dis-
criminatory institution. Id. at 581.
46 349 S.E.2d 655 (S.C. Ct. App. 1986).
47 Id. at 656
48 Id. at 657. The court in this case was confronted with the typical situation of distant
relatives of a long-dead and generous testator trying to obtain the assets that the testator in-
tended to be devoted to charitable uses. This case is an example of how courts allow the trust
to continue without the offending provision.
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Another typical case refusing enforcement is Lockwood v. Killian,49
a case involving a trust that provided scholarships for needy and deserv-
ing Congregationalist Caucasian boys who graduated from high schools
in Hartford County, Connecticut. Since there were too few people who
satisfied these criteria, the scholarship fund instituted an action request-
ing instructions. Having previously decided that there were no constitu-
tional objections to this trust,50 the Connecticut Supreme Court modified
the trust to eliminate the sex and race restrictions but allowed the relig-
ious and other limitations to remain in force.51 Although the court could
have expanded the pool of qualified beneficiaries in a variety of ways,
the court chose to eliminate the race and sex limitations. 52 As is typical
in these cases, the court did not explicitly hold that racially (or sexually)
discriminatory trusts are invalid, 53 but managed to refuse to enforce the
discriminatory provisions. 54
The most recent case refusing to enforce a racially discriminatory
trust is Home for Incurables of Baltimore City v. University of Maryland
Medical System Corporation,5 5 decided by the Maryland Court of Ap-
peals in 2002. In this case, the testator's will created a trust providing
trust income to four individuals for life. 56 On the death of the last in-
come beneficiary, the trust assets were to go to the Keswick Home to
provide accommodations for "white patients. ' '57 If the bequest was "not
49 425 A.2d 909 (Conn. 1979).
50 Lockwood v. Killian, 375 A.2d 998, 1007 (Conn. 1977).
51 Lockwood, 425 A.2d at 914. Cf Hermitage Methodist Homes of Va. v. Dominion
Trust Co., 387 S.E.2d 740 (Va. 1990), in which the Supreme Court of Virginia dealt with a
trust that provided benefits for charitable organizations "so long as" the organizations provided
benefits only to members of the "White Race." Id. at 741. If the organizations provided
benefits to people who were not white, the benefits were ultimately to go to another organiza-
tion with no limitations with respect to the race of people served. Id. at 742. The Virginia
court was willing to "assume, without deciding, that the ... racially discriminatory provisions
are unconstitutional and void." Id. at 744. It, however, decided the case on state property law
grounds by following the alternative disposition plan of the trust. Id. at 744. This resulted in
the assets passing to the non-discriminatory beneficiary organization. Id. at 747.
The decision in Hermitage Methodist Homes has been criticized as enforcing a racially
discriminatory trust by following the alternative disposition scheme of the trust. Dean Bar-
clay, Dead Hands and State Actors: The Racially Discriminatory Charitable Trust in Hermit-
age Methodist Homes, 7 WASH. & LEE RACE & ETHNic ANC. L.J. 85 (2001). This is an
intellectually consistent argument. But the most important result of this case is that all parties
agreed that the racially discriminatory provisions could not be enforced.
52 The court could have expanded the geographical area from which beneficiaries could
come; it could have eliminated the religious limitation or it could have eliminated the require-
ment of recent high school graduation.
53 A vigorous dissent by Justice Bogdanski contended that there was state action in the
participation of the attorney general and that the discriminatory provisions could not be en-
forced. Lockwood, 425 A.2d at 915 (Bogdanski, J., dissenting).
54 Id. at 914.
55 797 A.2d 746 (Md. 2002).
56 Id. at 748.
57 Id.
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acceptable" to the Keswick Home, the assets were to go to the University
of Maryland Hospital free of any racial restriction. 58
A Maryland statute prohibited hospitals from discriminating on the
basis of race, 59 which made it impossible for the Keswick Home to ac-
cept the bequest as written. 60 The Maryland Court of Appeals held that
the assets should go to the Keswick Home free of the racial restriction
rather than to the alternative beneficiary. 61 The court believed that order-
ing the distribution of the assets to go to the alternative beneficiary
would have been enforcement of the racially restrictive provision. The
court noted that "[t]oday in Maryland, there are few if any public policies
stronger than the policy against discrimination based on race or color."62
Additionally, the court stated that "where a condition attached to a be-
quest is clearly illegal and violates a strong public policy, the illegal por-
tion of the condition should be excised and the bequest enforced without
regard for the illegal condition. 63
3. State Action by Court Enforcement
A few cases have directly addressed the question of whether courts
may enforce racially discriminatory trusts. For instance, in Bank of Del-
aware v. Buckson,64 a Delaware court dealt with a trust administered by
public officials for "white youths or young men."'65 The court eliminated
the racial restriction because the law and the racial population of the
schools had changed. 66 The court noted Shelley v. Kraemer67 and stated
that "the Court may not advise the Trustee to reject applications from
non-whites because such advice would amount to state (judicial) en-
forced discrimination in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment." 68 In
invalidating the discriminatory provisions, the court rested its opinion on
the judicial role, rather than on the administrative role of public offi-
cials. 69 While it fell short of holding that all racially discriminatory char-
itable trusts are unconstitutionally unenforceable, the case appears to
require that conclusion.
58 Id.
59 MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. II § 19-355 (2000).
60 Home for Incurables of Bait. City v. Univ. of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 797 A.2d 746, 747
(Md. 2002).
61 Id. at 756.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 255 A.2d 710 (Del. Ch. 1969).
65 Id. at 713.
66 Id. at 717.
67 334 U.S. 1 (1947). See also discussion infra Part II.C.4.
68 Bank of Del., 255 A.2d at 715. See also In re Will of Potter, 275 A.2d 574, 579 (Del.
Ch. 1970) (taking a similar approach).
69 Bank of Del., 255 A.2d at 715.
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Tinnin v. First United Bank7° dealt with a charitable trust intended
to provide loans to white college students. The court referred to Shelley
v. Kraemer in holding that the racially discriminatory provision could not
be enforced and that the trust should continue without it. However, be-
cause all parties agreed that the provision was unenforceable,7 the Su-
preme Court of Mississippi did not discuss the issue in depth or
specifically hold that there was constitutionally prohibited state involve-
ment.72 The court assumed, without objection by the parties, that the
racial exclusion was unenforceable and focused on whether the trust
should be terminated and the assets given to the heirs or whether the trust
should continue without the offending limitation.73
4. Racially Discriminatory Trusts - The Current Law
No court has enforced a racially discriminatory trust since 1975.74
The reasoning that courts have used has been varied and often insubstan-
tial. However, the cases seem to reflect a general, unstated, and possibly
unrecognized feeling on the part of judges that charitable trusts are not
really private and that it is not appropriate in our society to allow them to
be racially discriminatory. They seem to show a general, but inade-
quately articulated, shift in our law away from enforcing these trusts.
This general shift may be reflected in the fact that no party in a number
of recent cases has been willing to argue for the validity of the discrimi-
natory provisions. Trustees, heirs, attorneys general, and judges often
agree that the discriminatory provision is invalid and move to the ques-
tion of whether to reform the trust or terminate it. 75 Attorneys general, in
particular, seem loath to argue in favor of the racially discriminatory pro-
visions. 76 The refusal of attorneys general to argue for enforcement of
70 502 So. 2d 659 (Miss. 1987).
71 This appears to be another case in which the court and all parties realized that current
law does not permit enforcement of racially discriminatory trusts even though there was no
clear authority to cite for the conclusion.
72 See Tinnin, 502 So. 2d 659.
73 id. at 666.
74 The last case to enforce a racially discriminatory provision is First Nat'l Bank v. Dan-
forth, 523 S.W.2d 808 (Mo. 1975), cert. denied sub nom. Lakeside Hosp. Ass'n v. First Nat'l
Bank, 421 U.S. 1016 (1975).
75 See Tinnin, 502 So. 2d 659; Colin McK. Grant Home v. Medlock, 349 S.E. 655,
656-57 (S.C. Ct. App. 1986); Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Buchanan, 346 F. Supp. 665
(D.D.C. 1972); In re Will of Potter, 275 A.2d 574 (Del. Ch. 1970); Hermitage Methodist
Homes of Va. v. Dominion Trust Co., 387 S.E.2d 740 (Va. 1990).
In re Will of Cram, 606 P.2d 145 (Mont. 1980), dealt with a sexually discriminatory trust
with public officials having administrative responsibilities. Id. at 147. The Montana Human
Rights Commission and the Superintendent of Public Instruction requested the court to elimi-
nate the discriminatory provisions. Id. at 147-48.
76 See, e.g., Lockwood v. Killian, 425 A.2d 909 (Conn. 1979); Buchanan, 346 F. Supp.
665; Dunbar v. Clayton Coll., 461 P.2d 28, 29 (Colo. 1969). Cf Ebitz v. Pioneer Nat'l Bank,
361 N.E.2d 225, 225 n.1 (Mass. 1977) (noting that the attorney general supported the female
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racially discriminatory charitable trusts may reflect our current legal and
social values. As a matter of policy and politics, it is unlikely that attor-
neys general would argue for race discrimination in any form. The law,
public policy, and practical politics seem to have come together to in-
spire attorneys general to refuse to try to enforce race discrimination
through charitable trusts.
D. SEX DISCRIMINATION
The law is much less clear with respect to sex discrimination. There
are fewer sex discrimination cases than race discrimination cases, 77 and
the conclusions are not consistent. There is no consensus, express or
otherwise, concerning whether sexually discriminatory trusts may be en-
forced. Although it would be logical for sex discrimination to be treated
the same as race discrimination, this has not happened. Some cases al-
low sexually discriminatory trusts to go forward, while others invalidate
the discriminatory provisions.
In 1983 the Court of Appeals of New York decided In re Estate of
Wilson,78 a case dealing with two trusts, the Wilson trust and the Johnson
trust, that provided scholarships for "young men." 79 The court allowed
the trusts to continue but only after removing the state involvement.80 In
re Estate of Wilson is the most recent of the cases upholding the validity
of sexually discriminatory trusts, and it may turn out to be the last.
Under the terms of each trust in Estate of Wilson, there was substantial
involvement of public officials in trust administration. 81 In the Wilson
trust, young men who satisfied the trust's requirements for excellence in
science were to be certified for the scholarships by the superintendent of
schools. 82 The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division's deci-
sion to strike the clause in the will providing for the school superinten-
dent's certification of the qualified candidates but allowed the gender
restriction to stand.8 3 In the Johnson trust, the scholarship recipients
were to be selected by the Board of Education with the assistance of the
plaintiffs who contended that a trust providing scholarships limited to "young men" should
also provide scholarships to women).
77 Litigants have sometimes decided not to litigate the sex discrimination issue. For
example, in Estate of Zahn, 16 Cal. App. 3d 106 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971), cert. denied sub nom.
Zahn v. Sec. Nat'l Bank, 404 U.S. 938 (1971), a testator directed that her assets were to be
used to establish a rest home for "Christian women and girls." Id. at 110. In trying to defeat
the trust, the decedent's heirs argued that the religious restriction made the trust invalid. Id. at
1 11. They did not raise the gender discrimination issue. Id.
78 452 N.E.2d 1228 (N.Y. 1983).
79 Id. at 1231.
80 Id. at 1234.
81 See id. at 1231.
82 Id.
83 Id. at 1237.
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high school principal. 84 The Court of Appeals reinstated the Surrogate's
Court's decision to retain the sex restrictions and to reform the trust by
replacing the school district with a private trustee.85 The result in Estate
of Wilson was that both sexually discriminatory trusts were allowed to
continue, but without the involvement of public officials.86 The court in
Estate of Wilson held that the discriminatory gender provisions in the
trusts did not violate the Equal Protection Clause and were not contrary
to public policy.87
In an earlier case, Shapiro v. Columbia Union National Bank,88 the
Supreme Court of Missouri dealt with a trust providing scholarships for
"deserving Kansas City Missouri boys" at Yale University or the Univer-
sity of Kansas City.89 A bank was trustee, but officials of the University
of Missouri at Kansas City,90 a public institution, processed scholarship
applications and made a "tentative award" that was subject to approval
by the private trustee.91 The court held that there was no state action and
that the trust could proceed with benefits limited to males.92
Shapiro and Estate of Wilson are notable because they demonstrate
the willingness of courts in the late 1970s and early 1980s to permit sex
discrimination in charitable trusts. By this time, courts in similar cases
involving race were searching for ways not to enforce them.93 The
courts appear to be more willing to permit sex discrimination in trusts
than they are to permit race discrimination.
In contrast, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire dealt with gender
discriminatory trusts in In re Certain Scholarship Funds in a different
way.94 This case involved two charitable scholarship trusts providing
scholarships to male students in public high schools.95 To be eligible for
an award, the student had to be recommended by his high school princi-
pal.96 Furthermore, one of the trusts limited the scholarships to Protes-
84 Id. at 1231.
85 Id. at 1237.
86 The Supreme Court of Montana reached a similar conclusion in In re Will of Cram,
606 P.2d 145, 150 (Mont. 1980). The conclusions of these cases are illogical, but they are
conclusions that courts have consistently made.
87 In re Estate of Wilson, 452 N.E.2d at 1234.
88 576 S.W.2d 310 (Mo. 1978).
89 Id. at 312-13.
90 The trust instrument had been amended by court order to substitute the University of
Missouri at Kansas City. Id. at 313.
91 Id. at 316.
92 Id. at 321.
93 See, e.g., Lockwood v. Killian, 425 A.2d 909 (Conn. 1979), and Colin McK. Grant
Home v. Medlock, 349 S.E.2d 655 (S.C. Ct. App. 1986).
94 575 A.2d 1325 (N.H. 1990).
95 Id. at 1325.
96 Id.
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tant boys. 97 The school board selected the scholarship recipients on the
basis of the recommendation of the principal. 98 The school board sought
to have the trusts reformed to eliminate the discriminatory provisions.99
The trial court exercised its cy pres powers to replace the terms "boy"
and "protestant boy" in the trusts with "student."' 00 The defendant attor-
ney general of New Hampshire subsequently appealed. 10 The Supreme
Court of New Hampshire affirmed. 10 2 The attorney general argued to the
New Hampshire Supreme Court that the court should exercise its powers
of equitable deviation, rather than cy pres, and eliminate the requirement
of participation of public officials in the administration of the trust, as
was done in Estate of Wilson.' 0 3 If the attorney general had prevailed,
the sexually and religiously discriminatory trust limitations would have
continued under the supervision of private individuals.
Relying on the equal protection clause of the New Hampshire con-
stitution and the state cy pres statute, the New Hampshire Supreme Court
removed the discriminatory provisions from the trust. The court chose
not to remove the public involvement and allow the discriminatory trust
to continue as was done in Estate of Wilson. As the court saw the issue,
it had to decide "whether its first priority is to end the discrimination or
to preserve it by substituting a private administrative mechanism that
would, if chosen by the testator, have carried no unconstitutional impli-
cation."' 0 4 The court stated that "when the decision-making mechanism,
as here, is so entwined with public institutions and government, discrimi-
nation becomes the policy statement and product of society itself and
cannot stand against the strong and enlightened language of our
constitution."' 10 5
Apparently the New Hampshire court believed that it would violate
its state equal protection clause to have the court reforming an unconsti-
tutional discriminatory trust. However, it did not invalidate discrimina-
tory trusts generally but instead stated that the appointment or
reappointment of trustees in discriminatory trusts that did not have state
officials involved in the administration did not violate the constitution. 06
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 This case is an example of the unease that government officials and trustees feel when
they are required to administer discriminatory trusts.
100 In re Certain Scholarship Funds, 575 A.2d at 1326.
10 It is notable that the attorney general was willing to appeal a case eliminating sex and
religious provisions. By 1990 most attorneys general were quite reluctant to support racially
discriminatory trusts.
102 In re Certain Scholarship Funds, 575 A.2d at 1329.
103 452 N.E.2d 1228 (N.Y. 1983).
104 In re Certain Scholarship Funds, 575 A.2d at 1329.
105 Id. at 1330.
106 Id. at 1329.
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Even though Certain Scholarship Funds rests narrowly on the state
constitution and cy pres statute, it is important because it reflects the idea
that court supervision of discriminatory trusts may, at least in some lim-
ited circumstances, constitute state action that impermissibly involves the
state in discrimination. Although the case involved only sex and relig-
ious discrimination, the New Hampshire court would undoubtedly reach
the same conclusion if race discrimination had been involved.
In Ebitz v. Pioneer National Bank,10 7 the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts affirmed a Probate Court decision that interpreted the
phrase "worthy and ambitious young men" to include women in a trust
providing law school scholarships. 10 8 According to the court, there was
an ambiguity but the will as a whole showed that the testator "used the
term 'men' in its generic sense, which includes women."' 10 9 Although
the Probate Court and the Supreme Judicial Court refused to address
equal protection issues raised by the plaintiffs and the attorney gen-
eral,1 0 the Supreme Judicial Court stated that "if some ambiguity should
remain, we think the declared policy of the Commonwealth (art. 106 of
the Amendments to the Massachusetts Constitution) regarding equal
treatment of the sexes should lead us to resolve it in favor of the
plaintiffs.""1 '
It is difficult to take the reasoning of the majority opinion in Ebitz
seriously.'" 2 A simple reading of the words used in the will indicates
that the testator meant what he said - that the scholarships were to be
for men but not women. Why then did the court declare the startling
proposition that "young men" really meant "young men and young wo-
men?" While it is inherently speculative to try to determine the "real"
reasoning of a court, my impression of the holdings of the Probate Court
and Supreme Judicial Court is that they simply felt it was unacceptable
for a charitable trust to discriminate on the basis of sex. 1' 3 The reference
to the declared policy of the Massachusetts constitution requiring equal
treatment of the sexes supports this conclusion. The holding of Ebitz is
effectively the same as if the court held the sex limitation void as con-
trary to public policy and used its cy pres or deviation powers to reform
107 361 N.E.2d 225 (Mass. 1977).
108 Id. at 225 n.2.
109 Id. at 227.
11o Id. at 226.
'I Id. at 227.
112 See id. (Quirico, J., dissenting).
113 However, other courts have allowed sexually discriminatory trusts to continue without
the involvement of public officials. See In re Estate of Wilson, 452 N.E.2d 1228 (N.Y. 1983);
Shapiro v. Columbia Union Nat'l Bank, 576 S.W.2d 310 (Mo. 1978), discussed supra at Part
I.C.2.
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the trust. In any event, a holding of invalidity because of public policy
would be much easier to believe." 14
In summary, there is no consistent approach to sexually discrimina-
tory trusts. Sexually discriminatory trusts are not challenged as often as
racially discriminatory trusts, and some courts are willing to enforce
them, provided that there is no direct state involvement in the manage-
ment of the trust. In my view, the opinion of the New Hampshire Su-
preme Court in Certain Scholarship Funds represents the better rationale
for not allowing enforcement of a gender discriminatory trust.
II. A UNIFIED APPROACH TO DISCRIMINATORY TRUSTS
A. INTRODUCTION
The current law is fragmented and inconsistent. The courts do not
generally enforce racially discriminatory trusts, although there is no con-
sistent reasoning. Sexually discriminatory trusts are sometimes enforced.
I believe that both types of discriminatory trusts represent unacceptable
discrimination and that neither should be enforced, regardless of whether
state officials participate directly in the operation of the trust.
There are two separate arguments compelling this conclusion. First,
racially and sexually discriminatory trusts violate public policy and
should not be enforced under traditional trust law. While this argument
is especially strong with respect to racially discriminatory trusts, I be-
lieve that it should also apply to sexually discriminatory trusts and that
neither should be enforced.
Second, racially and sexually discriminatory charitable trusts violate
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Charitable
trusts are public entities by their very nature and should not be permitted
to discriminate on the basis of race or sex, regardless of whether state
officials are trustees or otherwise directly administer the trusts. There is
state involvement through the enforcement by state attorneys general and
through the enforcement mechanisms of the courts. As noted by the
New Hampshire Supreme Court, the decision-making mechanisms of
charitable trusts are intimately entwined with public institutions and gov-
ernment.' '5 The discriminatory nature of the trusts along with the state
involvement through the courts and attorneys general violate the Equal
Protection Clause.
Both arguments rest on the fact that all valid charitable trusts are
essentially public entities that serve public purposes. Charitable trusts
114 The court may have wished to base its conclusion on the narrowest possible ground -
that of interpretation of the will's words rather than on the broad and unruly basis of public
policy or the state and federal constitutions.
115 In re Certain Scholarship Funds, 575 A.2d 1325, 1330 (N.H. 1990).
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are treated generously by the law and, because of their public nature,
relieved from many of the rules that limit private trusts. 116 For example,
charitable trusts are exempt from federal income taxation. 1 7 Addition-
ally, general trust law relieves charitable trusts from many of the restric-
tions that apply to private trusts. They are free from the limitations of
the rule against perpetuities and may last forever.' 18 They are not subject
to some of the rules with respect to accumulations,' 19 those against re-
moteness in vesting, 120 and those against suspension of the power of
alienation.' 2' Additionally, courts are permitted to modify charitable
trusts to meet changed circumstances under the cy pres doctrine. 122
In addition, charitable trusts are public entities because they have
substantial involvement with the state through the courts and attorneys
general. Given the public nature of charitable trusts, they should be held
to higher standards than those that apply to purely private entities. They
should not be allowed to engage in race or sex discrimination. As stated
by Justice Black, "[t]he more an owner, for his advantage, opens up his
property for use by the public in general, the more do his rights become
circumscribed by the statutory and constitutional rights of those who use
it."123 The creator of a charitable trust creates an entity devoted to the
public good and gives up many of the privileges of private ownership.
Such trusts should be governed by the standards that apply to public
entities.
116 See Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150, 1157 (D.D.C. 1971) (discussing the privi-
leges afforded to charitable trusts), affid sub nim. Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971).
117 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (West 2002).
118 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 124 cmt. e (1957); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
PROPERTY: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 2.1 (1983). According to George Bogert:
The courts have refused to apply any rule limiting the duration of trusts to charitable
trusts because they have felt that the social advantages of such trusts more than
offset the disadvantages of permitting a donor to make provisions for the disposition
of his property far into the future and to fix the status of property indefinitely.
GEORGE G. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 351 (2d ed. rev. 1992 & Supp.
2001).
119 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 401 cmt. k (1959); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
PROPERTY § 2.2(2) (1983). See also BOGERT, supra note I18, at § 352 (discussing the rule
against accumulations).
120 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 365 (1959); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP-
ERTY § 1.6 (1983). See also BOGERT, supra note 118, at § 342 (discussing the rule against
remoteness of vesting).
121 See BOGERT, supra note 118, at § 350 (discussing the suspension of the power of
alienation).
122 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 395-401 (1959).
123 Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 506 (1946), quoted in Lockwood v. Killian, 425
A.2d 909, 916 (Conn. 1979) (Bogdanski, J., dissenting).
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B. PUBLIC POLICY
1. Introduction
Charitable trusts that accomplish purposes against public policy are
invalid.124 Although there are relatively few cases dealing with the issue
of public policy in charitable trusts, 125 it is clear that trusts seeking to
accomplish ends inconsistent with our current fundamental values are not
valid.
The clearest analysis of the public policy doctrine has been in the
context of the tax treatment of charities. In Bob Jones University v.
United States,126 the Supreme Court dealt with whether a university that
had racially discriminatory admissions and other policies was exempt
from federal income taxation. 127 Basing its conclusion on the common
law of charitable trusts, the Court held that the university was not chari-
table and therefore did not qualify for the tax exemption and other bene-
fits accorded charitable organizations. 128 In interpreting the charitable
tax exemption statute, the Court stated that "entitlement to tax exemption
depends on meeting certain common law standards of charity - namely,
that an institution seeking tax-exempt status must serve a public purpose
and not be contrary to established public policy. ' 129 The Court
explained:
124 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 377 cmt. c (1959). This comment states: "A
trust for a purpose the accomplishment of which is contrary to public policy, although not
forbidden by law, is invalid." This limitation on the purposes of charitable trusts is a more
specific application of the rule provided for trusts generally by RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TRUSTS § 62, which states that "[a] trust or a provision in the terms of a trust is invalid if the
enforcement of the trust or a provision would be against public policy, even though its per-
formance does not involve the commission of a criminal or tortious act by the trustee."
The U.S. Supreme Court announced the principle in 1861, stating that "it has now be-
come an established principle of American law, that courts of chancery will sustain and pro-
tect ... a gift ... to public charitable uses, provided the same is consistent with local laws and
public policy .. " Perin v. Carey, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 465, 501 (1860), cited in Bob Jones
Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 588 (1983). Cf. Ould v. Wash. Hosp. for Foundlings, 95
U.S. 303 (1877) (stating that a charitable trust is almost anything that promotes public well-
being, provided that the use does not violate public policy or law).
The public policy principle is also supported by authoritative treatises. See BOGERT,
supra note 118, at § 361; AUSTIN WAKEMAN ScoTr, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 377 (1939).
125 See, e.g., In re Estate of Mealy, 204 P.2d 971 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1949) (holding that
a bequest to a newspaper associated with the Communist Party was not void as against public
policy); Eckles v. Lounsberry, I I N.W.2d 638 (Iowa 1961) (finding that a trust to promote
vocal music and proper development of lungs in school children did not violate public policy).
126 461 U.S. 574 (1983). The majority opinion by Chief Justice Burger is a comprehen-
sive work of scholarship on the common law of charitable trusts and taxation.
127 Specifically, the case deals with tax-exempt status under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). In addi-
tion, the Court decided the related issue of whether contributions to the university were tax
deductible under I.R.C. § 170.
128 Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 595.
129 Id. at 586.
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The form and history of the charitable exemption and
deduction sections of the various income tax Acts reveal
that Congress was guided by the common law of charita-
ble trusts .... The House Report on the Tax Reform Act
of 1969 ...stated that the § 501(c)(3) exemption was
available only to institutions that served "the specified
charitable purposes"... and described "charitable" as "a
term that has been used in the law of trusts for hundreds
of years."' 130
The Court went on to evaluate race discrimination in education
against the common law requirement that charitable trusts must not vio-
late public policy and concluded that charitable trust law does not permit
race discrimination. 31 The Court supported its conclusions by pointing
out that each of the three branches of government has unequivocally
taken the position that race discrimination in education violated national
public policy. It noted that "[a]n unbroken line of cases following Brown
v. Board of Education establishes beyond doubt this Court's view that
racial discrimination in education violates a most fundamental national
public policy .... 132 Further, it pointed out that "[t]he Executive
Branch has consistently placed its support behind eradication of racial
discrimination," citing the actions of presidents Truman, Eisenhower,
and Kennedy. 133 Additionally, the Court noted, "Congress, in Titles IV
and VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ... clearly expressed its agree-
ment that race discrimination in education violates a fundamental public
policy. Other sections of that Act, and numerous enactments since then,
testify to the public policy against race discrimination."'' 34
The Court's reasoning in Bob Jones University is clear and persua-
sive. It demonstrates that racially discriminatory trusts are contrary to
the public policy of the United States. Accordingly, a trust or other or-
ganization discriminating on the basis of race should not receive the
favorable tax treatment accorded charitable organizations. Although the
decision ultimately dealt with the tax status of the university, its reason-
ing rested squarely on common law charitable trust analysis.
130 Id. at 588 n.12. In addition, the Court stated, "[w]e need not consider whether Con-
gress intended to incorporate into the Internal Revenue Code any aspects of charitable trust
law other than the requirements of public benefit and a valid public purpose." Id.
131 Id. at 592-604.
132 Id. at 593.
133 Id. at 594. The Court cited President Truman's executive orders prohibiting racial
discrimination in federal employment, President Eisenhower's employment of military forces
to ensure compliance with federal standards in school desegregation programs, and President
Kennedy's order prohibiting racial discrimination in the granting of federal assistance housing
and related facilities.
134 Id. at 594 (referring to "[o]ther sections of that Act," such as the Voting Rights Act of
1965, Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, and the Emergency School Aid Act of 1972).
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State case law, statutes and administrative pronouncements are con-
sistent with federal authorities in demonstrating that race and other dis-
crimination is contrary to our public policy. Even a cursory examination
of state authorities uncovers hundreds of pronouncements that race dis-
crimination is not acceptable in a vast array of circumstances. Some
state constitutions have provisions prohibiting race and other discrimina-
tion. 135 Many state statutes prohibit race and other discrimination. 36
State regulations, not surprisingly, are consistent in prohibiting discrimi-
nation.' 37 State courts have also decided many cases that demonstrate
that discrimination is not acceptable.138
2. Application of the Public Policy Trust Concept to Racially
Discriminatory Trusts
The Court in Bob Jones University applied state common law public
policy concepts in determining that racially discriminatory entities are
not charitable for tax purposes. 139 It would be anomalous for courts to
apply state trust public policy concepts and conclude that such trusts are
charitable for state law purposes, even though they are not charitable for
tax purposes. A trust that is not charitable for federal tax purposes
should also not be charitable for state law purposes. The analysis used to
determine charitable status for state public policy purposes and for fed-
135 See, e.g., CONN. CONST. art. I, § 20 ("No person shall be denied the equal protection of
the law nor be subjected to segregation or discrimination in the exercise or enjoyment of his or
her civil or political rights because of religion, race, color, ancestry, national origin, sex or
physical or mental disability."); ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 17 ("All persons shall have the right to be
free from discrimination on the basis of race, color, creed, national ancestry and sex in the
hiring and promotion practices of any employer or in the sale or rental of property."); ILL.
CONST. art. I, § 18 ("The equal protection of the laws shall not be denied or abridged on
account of sex by the State or its units of local government and school districts."); N.Y.
CONST. art. I, § I I ("No person shall, because of race, color, creed or religion, be subjected to
any discrimination in his civil rights by any other person or by any firm, corporation, or insti-
tution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision of the state.").
136 There are many such statutes in every state. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 27.182 (1998)
(requiring state attorneys to eliminate compensation inequities based on gender or race for
assistant state attorneys); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 125.111 (Anderson 2001) (prohibiting race,
gender, and other discrimination in hiring by people performing state construction contracts).
137 See, e.g., ALA. ADMIN. CODE r. 130-X-l-.09 (1991) (requiring people receiving state
grants to comply with federal anti-discrimination laws); IND. ADMIN. CODE tit. 210, r. 3-1-15
(1992) ("Inmates shall not be subject to discrimination based on race[,] . . . sex" or other
characteristics); OR. ADMIN. R. 571-040-0382 (1996) (stating that the University of Oregon is
prohibited from contracting with any entity that practices race, sex, or other discrimination).
138 See, e.g., Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Comm'n on Human Rights & Opportunities, 487
A.2d 201 (Conn. 1985); In re Certain Scholarship Funds, 575 A.2d 1325 (N.H. 1990) (apply-
ing New Hampshire discrimination law that paralleled federal law), discussed supra at Part
I.D.
139 Although Bob Jones University dealt with a university, charitable trusts are treated in
the same manner as universities for tax exemption and charitable deduction purposes. The
same Internal Revenue Code provisions govern exemption, I.R.C. § 501(c)(3), and charitable
income tax deductions for contributions, I.R.C. § 170.
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eral tax purposes is identical. It would be strange indeed for this analysis
to lead to opposite conclusions on the same facts.
Holding that racially discriminatory trusts are uncharitable and un-
enforceable 40 would be consistent with the holdings, if not the reason-
ing, of the modem state trusts law cases dealing with racially
discriminatory trusts. As discussed above, 14' courts in recent decades
have uniformly refused to enforce racially discriminatory trusts.
We have reached the point in our history where courts can reasona-
bly declare that trusts that discriminate against blacks and other minority
racial groups are contrary to public policy and not enforceable as charita-
ble trusts. The reasoning of Bob Jones University provides authoritative
support for this conclusion.
However, public policy is a vague and malleable concept, and some
trusts that differentiate on the basis of race may not contravene public
policy. In particular, trusts discriminating in favor of traditionally disad-
vantaged groups may be justifiable as attempts to rectify past discrimina-
tion or to correct economic and opportunity imbalances. A trust
providing benefits for needy blacks or Latinos may not violate public
policy even though it excludes other racial or ethnic groups. Such trust
should be enforced if there are public policies or traditional charitable
purposes such as elimination of poverty, compensation for past discrimi-
nation, or the support of religion that are advanced by the enforcement of
the trusts. 142 Additionally, attempts through charitable trusts to provide
educational and other opportunities to economically disadvantaged racial
groups should be favored and enforced.
No charitable trust, however its beneficiaries are defined, will pro-
vide equal benefits to every racial group. No group of potential benefi-
ciaries of a charitable trust, short of all of the people in the world, would
provide benefits that do not favor one racial group or another. For exam-
ple, a trust providing scholarships to students at a particular school will
benefit some racial groups more than others because no school (or other
organization) exactly represents the racial makeup of the world. Even
140 A finding that a purportedly charitable racially discriminatory trust violated public
policy would not by itself void the trust. The trust, in theory, would be a private trust that
could discriminate. However, a purportedly charitable discriminatory trust that failed as a
charitable trust would almost certainly also fail as a private trust because a valid private trust
must have identifiable beneficiaries who could enforce the trust. A failed charitable trust
would be unlikely to have identifiable beneficiaries. For example, a trust that provided schol-
arships for needy students but which excluded black students should fail to be a charitable trust
because of its racial discrimination. It would also fail as a private trust because there would be
no identifiable beneficiaries.
141 See supra Part I.B.
142 See, e.g., Trustees of the Univ. of Del. v. Gebelein, 420 A.2d 1191 (Del. Ch. 1980)
(allowing a public university to administer a trust that provided scholarships to women but not
to men because the discrimination was benign and compensated for past discrimination).
2003]
298 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 12:275
though the trust would benefit some racial groups and exclude others, the
educational benefits of helping an educational institution and needy stu-
dents should outweigh the racially discriminatory effects of the trust.
Such a charitable trust would not violate public policy.143
Decisions about whether any particular trust violates public policy
would need to be made on a case-by-case basis. 144 While it is impossible
to state a rule that will provide clear answers in all cases, I believe that
public policy can be defined with sufficient accuracy to reach reasonable
results in most circumstances. First, trusts that exclude groups that have
traditionally suffered discrimination should be viewed skeptically and
perhaps presumed contrary to public policy. Second, courts should de-
termine if the beneficiaries are defined in a rational manner that does not
rest on race. For example, a trust for the members of a particular church
or residents of a particular city should be valid even if the members of
the church or the residents of the city were predominantly of one race,
provided there is a rational, non-discriminatory reason for the trust to
exist. Trusts of this sort would not violate public policy and should be
enforced. Third, the court should examine the definition of beneficiaries
to determine if some people who would otherwise be members of the
class of beneficiaries are eliminated because of race and there is no other
public policy to justify the racial classification. Such trusts would be
against public policy and should be void. For example, a trust providing
scholarships for only white members of a particular church or only for
white residents of a city would be contrary to public policy and should
not be enforced. Finally, even if a trust defines beneficiaries on a racial
basis, it may not contravene public policy if there are other public poli-
cies that justify the racial classification. For example, a trust that pro-
vides scholarships to black residents of a particular city might be
justified if the effect of the trust is to counter past race discrimination or
to relieve poverty among a racial group that is poorer than the rest of the
community. Similarly, scholarships for women enrolled in engineering
143 This reasoning is parallel to the constitutional reasoning that the Supreme Court has
used with respect to state statutes or actions that have a disproportionate impact on racial
groups but that do not have a racially discriminatory purpose. In Washington v. Davis, 426
U.S. 229 (1976), the Supreme Court stated:
[W]e have not held that a law, neutral on its face and serving ends otherwise within
the power of a government to pursue, is invalid under the Equal Protection Clause
simply because it may affect a greater proportion of one race than of another. Dis-
proportionate impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone of an invidious
racial discrimination forbidden by the Constitution. Standing alone, it does not trig-
ger the rule that racial classifications are to be subjected to the strictest scrutiny and
are justifiable only by the weightiest of considerations.
Id. at 242 (citation omitted).
144 To some extent, the decision that a particular trust does or does not violate public
policy will rest on the feel and impression of the case. We will recognize violations of public
policy when we see them, not before.
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schools might be justified as a means of encouraging women to enter a
profession where they are underrepresented.
While I believe that it is possible to articulate rational considera-
tions for courts to use in applying public policy to charitable trusts, deter-
mination of individual cases will often come down to the emotional feel
and impression of each case. The cases of recent decades refusing to
enforce racially discriminatory trusts appear to be based on the impres-
sion that enforcement of these trusts is just not the right thing to do. The
suggestions that I make here simply attempt to provide reasonable intel-
lectual support for the decisions that courts are already making.
While decisions would have to be made on a case-by-case basis,
reasonable conclusions can be achieved in most cases. For example, a
trust that provides scholarships for white students from Iowa appears dis-
criminatory on first impression and should be held to violate public pol-
icy because it discriminates against non-white people. This trust, on its
face, has race discrimination as one of its purposes and should be held to
violate public policy. On the other hand, a trust created by a church
member that provides scholarships for members of his or her church that
includes no black members does not seem discriminatory and should not
be held, absent other evidence of discrimination, to violate public pol-
icy.1 45 It should be enforced, even though all of the benefits would pass
exclusively to white beneficiaries. There can be valid, non-discrimina-
tory reasons to establish such a trust, even though the benefits pass inor-
dinately to one race.
3. Application of the Public Policy Trust Concept to Sexually
Discriminatory Trusts
As with racially discriminatory trusts, sexually discriminatory trusts
should also be held invalid because they violate public policy, provided
that there is no other public policy justifying them. It is abundantly clear
at the start of the twenty-first century that sex discrimination violates our
fundamental social values. Gender stereotypes and gender-based dis-
crimination, especially when imposed upon women, are now clearly con-
trary to prevailing core values of our society. As with race
145 However, in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), the Supreme Court held that
government activities that had a disproportionate impact on blacks did not violate the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment because there was no discriminatory purpose. While
it may seem to be exalting form over substance, there is a real difference between a trust that
exists to benefit a particular group and a trust that exists to benefit one group while excluding
another group. Both trusts exclude groups of people. But the trust with a discriminatory
purpose is harmful because it allows settlors to improperly discriminate on the basis of race
and other improper characteristics. The trust that has no discriminatory purpose does not harm
any of our constitutional or social values even though it may have a disproportionate impact on
racial, religious, or other groups.
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discrimination, the fact that gender discrimination still exists does not
alter the conclusion that it is unacceptable and contrary to public policy
in our present society.146
The Supreme Court in Bob Jones University examined a variety of
sources and found widespread evidence that race discrimination violated
present public policy. It examined decisions of the courts, 147 federal stat-
utes, 148 and administrative decisions of the executive branch. 149 In each
of these areas, the Court found overwhelming evidence that race discrim-
ination violated our public policy.' 50
Applying the same sort of analysis to sex discrimination that the
Supreme Court used in Bob Jones University, we find, not surprisingly,
that there is convincing evidence in all three branches of the government
that gender discrimination is not acceptable in our current society. First,
it is useful to examine decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, both for
their holdings and for what they tell us about our present values - our
present public policy. In 1996, the Court decided United States v. Vir-
ginia,'5' a case dealing with the males-only admission policy of the Vir-
ginia Military Institute (VMI), a state institution providing education to
men in a military environment. The specific issue was whether the
males-only admission policy violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Acknowledging that views of gender discrimi-
nation have changed over the course of the past century, 52 the Court
stated its present view of racial classifications:
To summarize the Court's current directions for cases of
official classification based on gender: Focusing on the
differential treatment or denial of opportunity for which
relief is sought, the reviewing court must determine
146 When it became clear that racial discrimination was unacceptable in our society, there
was (and there continues to be) considerable racial discrimination. The same is true of gender
discrimination. It is still common, but enlightened public opinion now rejects gender discrimi-
nation as being contrary to our social values.
147 Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 593 (1983).
148 Id. at 594.
149 Id. at 594-95.
150 Id. at 593-95.
151 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
152 The Court observed:
As a plurality of this court acknowledged a generation ago, "our Nation has had a
long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination." Through a century plus three
decades and more of that history, women did not count among voters composing
"We the People"; not until 1920 did women gain a constitutional right to the
franchise. And for half a century thereafter, it remained the prevailing doctrine that
government, both federal and state, could withhold from women opportunities ac-
corded men so long as any "basis in reason" could be conceived for the
discrimination.
Id. at 531 (citations omitted).
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whether the proffered justification is "exceedingly per-
suasive." The burden of justification is demanding and
it rests entirely on the State. 153
The Court in the VMI case relied upon Mississippi University for
Women v. Hogan154 for the proposition "that a party seeking to uphold
government action based on sex must establish an 'exceedingly persua-
sive justification' for the classification."' 55 The plaintiff in Mississippi
University for Women was a male nurse who wished to enroll in the
nursing program at a university that only accepted women. The Supreme
Court held that the university's gender discriminatory admissions policy
violated the Equal Protection Clause. The Court pointed out that it has
invalidated many gender discriminatory statutes "that relied upon the
simplistic, outdated assumption that gender could be used as a 'proxy for
other, more germane bases of classification.'",,56 For example, the Court
has invalidated a state statute that specified a higher age of majority for
males rather than females' 57 and a statute that granted husbands the right
to manage and dispose of jointly owned property without the spouse's
consent.' 58 Additionally, the Court invalidated a statute that required a
widower, but not a widow, to show he was incapacitated from earning
before he could recover benefits for a spouse's death under worker's
compensation laws. 159 It also invalidated a statute providing that only
men could be ordered to pay alimony following divorce. 160 It is abun-
dantly clear that the courts view sex discrimination in statutes as highly
suspect and will uphold discriminatory statutes only if there is a compel-
ling reason. 161
153 Id. at 532-33.
154 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
155 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 524.
156 Miss. Univ. for Women, 458 U.S. at 726 (quoting Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198
(1976)).
157 Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975).
158 Kirchberg v. Feenestra, 450 U.S. 455 (1981).
159 Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142 (1980).
160 Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979). In addition, the Court has invalidated statutes that
provided that women could purchase "nonintoxicating beer" at a younger age than could men,
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), that provided that widows, but not widowers, could
collect survivors benefits under the Social Security Act, Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S.
636 (1975), that conditioned determination of a spouse's dependency upon the sex of the
member of the armed forces claiming dependency benefits, Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S.
677 (1973), and that preferred men to women as administrators of estates, Reed v. Reed, 404
U.S. 71 (1971).
161 These cases do not apply directly to state trust law public policy, but they do illustrate
general judicial disapproval of gender distinctions. This is parallel to the Court's citing Brown
v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), in Bob Jones University v. United States, 461
U.S. 574, 593 (1983), to illustrate that racial discrimination violates public policy.
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Looking to federal statutes, we find, not surprisingly, that there are
many statutes prohibiting sex discrimination. Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964162 prohibits employment discrimination because of a
person's sex. 163 The Title VII discrimination prohibition by its terms
applies equally to sex and race discrimination,164 an indication that sex
and race discrimination are equally contrary to the public policy of the
United States. Similarly, Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of
1972165 prohibits sex discrimination in education programs that receive
federal financial assistance. There are many other federal statutes that
prohibit sex discrimination in many circumstances. 166
The administrative policies of the executive branch of the federal
government also illustrate a firm commitment to the principle of non-
discrimination on the basis of sex as well as race, religion, and national
origin. For example, an executive order states, "it is the policy of the
Government of the United States to provide equal opportunity in Federal
employment for all persons, to prohibit discrimination in employment
because of race, color, religion, sex or national origin .... ,,167 The gen-
eral policy of prohibiting sex discrimination is also reflected in hundreds
of federal regulations. For example, operators of hotels in national parks
are prohibited from discriminating against employees on the basis of
sex, 168 and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission may not meet
in places that discriminate on the basis of sex. 169
Bob Jones University demonstrated that race discrimination is con-
trary to our public policy by examining the pronouncements of the three
162 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2000).
163 Id. § 2000e-2(a).
164 Id. (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of "race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin").
165 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681(a)-(c) (2000).
166 For example, sex discrimination is prohibited in the issuance of immigrant visas, 8
U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(A) (2000), in service as jurors in the federal courts, 28 U.S.C. § 1862
(2000), and in the Air Force Sergeants Association, 36 U.S.C. § 20204(b) (2000).
167 Exec. Order No. 11,478, 3 C.F.R. 803 (1966-1970), reprinted as amended in 42
U.S.C. § 2000e app., at 609-10 (2000). See also Exec. Order No. 11,375, 3 C.F.R. 684
(1966-1970) (stating that the Secretary of Labor or other contracting agency may require cer-
tain bidders and contractors to submit a statement that they do not discriminate on the basis of
"race, color, religion, sex or national origin").
168 36 C.F.R. § 5.8 (2002). Specifically, this section prohibits discrimination because of
race, creed, color, ancestry, sex, age, disabling condition, or national origin."
169 17 C.F.R. § 147.3(a) (2002). There are hundreds of examples of federal regulations
that prohibit sex discrimination. See, e.g., 34 C.F.R. § 106.1 (2002) (prohibiting sex discrimi-
nation in educational programs receiving federal financial assistance); 24 C.F.R. § 100.5
(2002) (implementing Department of Housing and Urban Development regulations enforcing
the Fair Housing Act's prohibition of discrimination in housing). Typically, one section of the
particular regulations prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religion, and other
factors. For example, no child in the National School Lunch Program may be discriminated
against because of "race, color, national origin, age, sex, or disability." 7 C.F.R. § 210.23
(2002).
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branches of our federal government. The courts, the administrative agen-
cies, and Congress have followed a similar pattern with respect to sex
discrimination. Each branch has declared many times and in many situa-
tions that sex discrimination is not to be tolerated. Applying the reason-
ing of Bob Jones University, it is clear that trusts that discriminate on the




The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohib-
its race 170 and sex 171 discrimination by states. Parties seeking to uphold
sex classification by states "must carry the burden of showing an 'ex-
ceedingly persuasive justification' for the classification." 172 According
to the Supreme Court "[t]he burden is met only by showing at least that
the classification serves 'important governmental objectives and that the
discriminatory means employed' are 'substantially related to the achieve-
ment of those objectives.' "173 Charitable trusts have significant state in-
volvement through the courts and through the states' attorneys general.
The significant involvement of judges and other public officials in the
administration of charitable trusts raises serious equal protection ques-
tions. 174 I believe that the state involvement in charitable trusts is so
significant that discriminatory charitable trusts violate the Equal Protec-
tion Clause and are not valid.
170 See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984) ("A core purpose of the Fourteenth
Amendment was to do away with all governmentally imposed discrimination based on race.");
Strader v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 307-08 (1880).
171 See Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723 (1982) ("Because the chal-
lenged policy expressly discriminates among applicants on the basis of gender, it is subject to
scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
172 Id. at 724 (quoting Kirchberg v. Feenestra, 450 U.S. 455, 461 (1981)); Personnel
Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273 (1979).
173 Miss. Univ. for Women, 458 U.S. at 724 (quoting Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co.,
446 U.S. 142, 150 (1980)).
174 Elias Clark, Charitable Trusts, the Fourteenth Amendment and the Will of Stephen
Girard, 66 YALE L.J. 979 (1957), is a classic early discussion of this issue. See also Katherine
F. Voyer, Note, Continuing the Trend Toward Equality: The Eradication of Racially and Sexu-
ally Discriminatory Provisions in Private Trusts, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 943 (1999).
This note contends that racially discriminatory provisions in private trusts violate the Four-
teenth Amendment and should not be enforced. This argument is based on the fact that all
trusts, charitable or private, have significant involvement by the state through the courts.
While this argument has merit, it is far beyond what the courts are now willing to do, given
that they are only reluctantly beginning to refuse enforcement of discriminatory charitable
trusts having far more state involvement than private trusts.
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2. State Action Requirement
The Equal Protection Clause is not violated unless there is state ac-
tion. 175 In discriminatory charitable trusts, the race or gender discrimina-
tion is usually clear on the face of the trust, and the question is whether
there is sufficient state action to make enforcement of the trust a viola-
tion of the Equal Protection Clause. Private discrimination, however of-
fensive, does not violate the Constitution.
The very nature of charitable trusts is public. 176 Their purpose is to
accomplish public goals, and the law treats them generously because
they are intended to help society as a whole. They are public because
they depend heavily on the courts and attorneys general to oversee and
enforce them. Although private individuals usually establish charitable
trusts with private assets, their purposes and operation make them public
entities. Government is deeply entwined in charitable trusts through the
courts and attorneys general.
A central characteristic of charitable trusts is that they must advance
some public charitable purpose. 177 The Restatement of Trusts states that
175 The Supreme Court has stated:
Since the decision of this Court in the Civil Rights Cases . . .the principle has
become firmly embedded in our constitutional law that the action inhibited by the
first section of the Fourteenth Amendment is only such action as may fairly be said
to be that of the States. That Amendment erects no shield against merely private
conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful.
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948) (citing Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883)).
176 The term "charitable" has never been defined precisely and changes as society
changes. See Scorr, supra note 124, at § 368. The law of charitable trusts can be traced to
the Statute of Charitable Uses enacted by Parliament in 1601. Stat. 43 Eliz. 1, c. 4 (1601). The
Statute of Charitable Uses lists a number of charitable purposes:
[S]ome for relief of aged, impotent and poor people, some for maintenance of sick
and maimed soldiers and mariners, schools of learning, free schools and scholars in
universities, some for repair of bridges, ports, havens, causeways, churches, sea-
banks and highways, some for education and preferment of orphans, some for or
towards relief, stock or maintenance for houses of correction, some for marriages of
poor maids, some for supportation, aid and help of young tradesmen, handicraftsmen
and persons decayed, and others for relief or redemption of prisoners or captives,
and for aid or ease of any poor inhabitants concerning payments of fifteens, setting
out of soldiers and other taxes.
Id. The charitable purposes listed in the Statute of Charitable Uses have generally been treated
as examples of the types of charitable uses, rather than an exclusive list. Lord Macnaghten
expressed a more current view of charitable purposes in 1891:
"Charity" in its legal sense comprises four principal divisions: trusts for the relief of
poverty; trusts for the advancement of education; trusts for the advancement of relig-
ion; and trusts for other purposes beneficial to the community, not falling under any
of the preceding heads. The trusts last referred to are not the less charitable in the
eye of the law, because incidentally they benefit the rich as well as the poor, as
indeed, every charity that deserves the name must do either directly or indirectly.
Comm'rs for Special Purposes of Income Tax v. Pemsel, [1891] A.C. 531, 583.
177 Ould v. Wash. Hosp. for Foundlings, 95 U.S. 303 (1877), cited in Bob Jones Univ. v.
United States, 461 U.S. 574, 588 (1983). The Court stated in Ould: "A charitable use, where
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charitable purposes include the relief of poverty, the advancement of ed-
ucation or religion, and the promotion of health and governmental pur-
poses. 178 In addition to these specified purposes, the Restatement notes
that charitable purposes include "other purposes the accomplishment of
which is beneficial to the community,"1 79 and the comments to the Re-
statement note that "[t]he common element of all charitable purposes is
that they are designed to accomplish objectives which are beneficial to
the community." 180
Of course, the fact that a trust must be beneficial to the community
at large does not by itself make the actions of the trust state involvement
for the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. People may do many
things with the intent and purpose of benefiting the community that are
not charitable for purposes of the law. 181 However, the essence of chari-
table trusts is that they exist for public purposes. Their public purposes
combined with the substantial involvement of courts and attorneys gen-
eral subject them to the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause.
3. State Action Through Attorneys General Enforcement
Charitable trusts do not have specific individuals as beneficiaries
because charitable trusts are, by definition, devoted to the good of the
community rather than to individuals. Therefore, charitable trusts often
have no identifiable beneficiaries to enforce them against trustee incom-
petence or malfeasance. 182 In such cases, state attorneys general have
the power and duty to represent the public in enforcing the trusts.183
neither law nor public policy forbids, may be applied to almost any thing that tends to promote
the well-doing and well-being of social man." Ould, 95 U.S. at 311.
The most frequently quoted definition of charity is contained in Jackson v. Phillips, 96
Mass. 539, 556 (1867):
A charity, in the legal sense, may be more fully defined as a gift, to be applied
consistently with existing laws, for the benefit of an indefinite number of persons,
either by bringing their minds or hearts under the influence of education or religion,
by relieving their bodies from disease, suffering or constraint, by assisting them to
establish themselves in life, or by erecting or maintaining public buildings or works
or otherwise lessening the burdens of government.
178 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 368 (1959).
179 Id. § 368(0.
180 Id. § 368 cmt a. In addition, according to the Restatement, "[a] trust for the promotion
of purposes which are of a character sufficiently beneficial to the community to justify permit-
ting property to be devoted forever to their accomplishment is charitable." Id. § 374.
181 For example, if a generous person provides support for a specific poor person, it is
simply a private act of generosity regardless of the fact that it may benefit the community to
have the poor person supported.
182 Trustees, of course have the duty to properly administer the trusts and to protect them
from the improper acts of others.
183 According to the Restatement of Trusts:
A suit may be maintained for the enforcement of a charitable trust by the Attorney
General or other public officer, or by a co-trustee, or by a person who has a special
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The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania analyzed the role of the attor-
ney general in a case involving the possible termination of a charitable
trust and reversion of the assets to the testator's family.' 84 It held that
the trial court should not have heard the case because the attorney gen-
eral was an indispensable party who was not represented. 185 In holding
that the trial court decree was void, the court summarized the role of the
attorney general:
The beneficiary of charitable trusts is the general public
to whom the social and economic advantages of the
trusts accrue. But because the public is the object of the
settlors' benefactions, private parties have insufficient fi-
nancial interest in charitable trusts to oversee their en-
forcement. Consequently, the Commonwealth itself
must perform this function if charitable trusts are to be
properly supervised. The responsibility for public super-
vision traditionally has been delegated to the attorney
general to be performed as an exercise of his parens pa-
triae powers.... These are the ancient powers of guard-
ianship over persons under disability and of
protectorship of the public interest which were held by
the Crown of England as the "father of the country"...
and which as part of the common law devolved upon the
states and federal government. . . . Specifically, these
powers permitted the sovereign, wherever necessary, to
see to the proper establishment of charities through his
officer, the attorney general, and to exercise supervisory
jurisdiction over all charitable trusts. 186
interest in the enforcement of the charitable trust, but not by persons who have no
special interest or by the settlor or his heirs, personal representatives or next of kin.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 391 (1959).
With respect to the public interest in charitable trusts, "[tihe community has an interest in
the enforcement of such trusts and the Attorney General represents the community in seeing
that the trusts are properly performed." Scorr, supra note 124, § 391.
With respect to people having a special interest, it is possible to create a charitable trust
entitling a particular person to benefits. For example, a charitable trust may be created to
benefit the minister of a particular church. The current minister of the church may enforce the
trust. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 391 cmt. c.
Settlors or their heirs generally may not enforce charitable trusts. RESTATEMENT (SEc-
OND) OF TRUSTS § 391 cmt. e.
184 Estate of Pruner, 136 A.2d 107 (Pa. 1957).
185 Id. at 110.
186 Id. at 109 (citations omitted); see also Glenmede Trust Co. v. Dow Chem. Co., 384 F.
Supp. 423 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Estate of Zahn, 93 Cal. Rptr. 810 (Cal. App. 1971), cert. denied
sub nom. Zahn v. Security Pac. Nat'l Bank, 404 U.S. 938 (1971); Averill v. Lewis, 138 A. 815
(Conn. 1927).
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The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania went on to hold that "in every pro-
ceeding which affects a charitable trust, whether the action concerns in-
validation, administration, termination or enforcement, the attorney
general must be made a party of record because the public as the real
party in interest in the trust is otherwise not properly represented."' 8 7
There are some circumstances in which an attorney general is the
only party who has standing to contest the actions of a trustee of a chari-
table trust. For example, only the attorney general can enforce the trust
if there is only one trustee and there is no one else in a special relation-
ship with the trust.' 88 It is absolutely necessary-that some one have the
power of enforcement because a trust with no one to enforce it is simply
not a trust. By definition, a trust imposes fiduciary duties upon the trus-
tee. Unenforceable fiduciary duties are not fiduciary duties at all, and the
arrangement fails as a trust because it lacks a trustee.1 89 Accordingly,
the enforcement powers of attorneys general are a critical element in the
existence of a charitable trust. The attorney general protects the commu-
nity's interest in charitable trusts.
In addition to enforcing charitable trusts against trustees, attorneys
general are heavily involved with the administration of charitable trusts.
In many states, the attorney general must maintain a register of charitable
trusts within the state.' 90 Attorneys general typically require charities to
file periodic reports concerning the trusts assets and administration of
trusts.191 Of more importance, attorneys general may investigate a chari-
table trust in order to determine if it is properly administered. The attor-
ney general may compel people to appear to provide information about
the operation of the trust. 192 In some states, the attorney general must
consent to termination of the trust. 193 Finally, attorneys general are
given the authority to institute proceedings to secure compliance with the
law and proper administration of the trust. 194
The relationship between charitable trusts and attorneys general is
close and has existed throughout the history of charitable trusts. How-
ever, the fact that states are substantially involved with charitable trusts
does not, by itself, mean that there is state action for equal protection
187 Estate of Pruner, 136 A.2d at 110.
188 An example would be a trust having one trustee created for the purpose of alleviation
of poverty. No individual would have standing to enforce the trust.
189 A charitable trust is a fiduciary relationship that imposes equitable duties upon the
trustee. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 348 (1959). A necessary part of equitable du-
ties and of a fiduciary relationship is that someone must be able to enforce the duties against
the trustee. In many cases the only party who can enforce the trust is the attorney general.
190 See, e.g., Illinois Charitable Trusts Act, 760 ILL. COMP. STAT. 55/5 (1993).
191 See, e.g., id. § 55/7.
192 See, e.g., id. § 55/9.
193 See, e.g., id. § 55/15.
194 See, e.g., id. § 55/12.
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purposes. While it is often not easy to determine when routine state reg-
ulatory activities cross over the line and become state action, 95 it ap-
pears that the supervisory activities of attorneys general are state action
for equal protection purposes.
The Supreme Court's decision in Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis196 is
useful in this analysis. This case involved the racially discriminatory
activities of a private club that had by-laws that limited membership to
"white male Caucasians."' 197 It allowed non-members to be served only
if they were eligible for membership and were accompanied by a
member. 198
Irvis, a black guest of a member of a Moose Lodge, was refused
service because of his race. He contended that the state's issuance of a
liquor license to the club amounted to state involvement with the club's
discriminatory practices that were prohibited by the Equal Protection
Clause. 199 The Court held that the issuance of liquor license was not a
sufficiently significant state involvement in the activities of the club to
be prohibited state action under the Fourteenth Amendment. 200
However, the Court reached a different conclusion in Moose Lodge
No. 107 with respect to Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board Regulations
that required "every club licensee [to] adhere to all of the provisions of
its Constitution and By-Laws." '20 ' The effect of the regulation was that
the state required individual private clubs to comply with the requirement
of race discrimination contained in the by-laws of the parent organiza-
tion. The Court enjoined the enforcement of the Liquor Control Board
regulation because "the result of [the regulation's] application in a case
where the constitution and bylaws of a club required race discrimination
would be to invoke the sanctions of the State to enforce a concededly
195 The Supreme Court has stated:
While the principle is easily stated, the question of whether particular discriminatory
conduct is private, on the one hand, or amounts to "state action," on the other hand,
frequently admits of no easy answer. "Only by sifting facts and weighing circum-
stances can the non-obvious involvement of the State in private conduct be attributed
its true significance."
Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 172 (1972) (quoting Burton v. Wilmington
Parking Auth., 365 U.S 715, 722 (1961)).
196 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
197 Id. at 166.
198 Id. at 178 n.6.
199 Id. at 165.
200 Id. at 173-77. The issuance of the liquor license and other regulation of the club are
similar in nature and function to the registration and reporting requirements that apply to chari-
table trusts. Accordingly, the state requirements of registration and reporting that apply to
charitable trusts are probably not state action under the reasoning of Moose Lodge No. 107.
201 Id. at 177 (quoting Regulations of the Pa. Liquor Control Bd. § 113.09 (June 1970
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discriminatory private rule."'2 0 2 Even though private actors in the opera-
tion of their private club created the discriminatory by-laws, requiring
compliance with the by-laws was prohibited state action. State enforce-
ment of a racially discriminatory private arrangement violates the Four-
teenth Amendment.
There is a striking parallel between the situation in Moose Lodge
No. 107 and discriminatory trusts. The discriminatory by-laws in Moose
Lodge No. 107 were the result of an agreement among private individuals
- the members of the club. Private individuals can act, and can agree to
act, in a discriminatory manner without implicating the state or the Con-
stitution. There was a violation of the Equal Protection Clause only be-
cause the state enforced the discriminatory private by-laws.
Trusts are created by the agreement of private parties - the settlor
and the trustee.2 0 3 In the case of a private trust, the actors are private
parties and the discriminatory nature of the trust does not create constitu-
tional problems. However, discriminatory charitable trusts are private
agreements enforceable by the state. They are not merely regulated by
the state; they are enforced by the state through the attorney general.
This certainly appears to be prohibited discriminatory state action. The
Supreme Court has noted that "[p]rivate biases may be outside the reach
of the law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect. 20 4
The supervisory and enforcement powers of attorneys general over chari-
table trusts result in states acting to enforce private biases.
Although the role of the attorneys general in supervising discrimina-
tory charitable trusts raises obvious state action concerns, few cases ad-
202 Id. at 178-79.
203 Of course, government entities may create trusts as part of their government activities,
and they may serve as trustees. Obviously, if the creator or the trustee of a trust is the state,
the trust may not discriminate on prohibited grounds. See In re Estate of Wilson, 452 N.E.2d
1228 (N.Y. 1983) (holding that public officials are not permitted to select scholarship recipi-
ents on behalf of a gender discriminatory trust).
204 Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984). This case dealt with the custody of a
child after divorce. The white mother had custody of the child. She began cohabiting with a
black man. The court held that it was a violation of the Equal Protection Clause for the trial
court to consider race in awarding custody to the father. Cf City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985) (holding that the city was not permitted to enforce
popular biases by requiring a special use permit for a proposed group home for the mentally
retarded).
2003]
310 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 12:275
dress this issue.205 In Lockwood v. Killian,20 6 the Supreme Court of
Connecticut considered the state action question in the context of a trust
restricting benefits to caucasian, Congregational boys. 20 7 The trial court
removed the race and sex restrictions 20 8 by use of the cy pres doctrine,
and the Connecticut Supreme Court considered the state action issue in
the context of the religion restriction. 20 9 It held that neither the actions
of the court210 nor the participation of the attorney general constituted
state action.21'
However, Justice Bogdanski had a different view of the discrimina-
tory charitable trusts in Lockwood v. Killian. According to Justice
Bogdanski, writing in dissent:
The power to dispose of property at death is a privilege
granted by law, supervised through probate and adminis-
tered by courts and judicially appointed fiduciaries.
While these incidents of ministerial control have been
thought too slight to constitute state action, the state's
role in a charitable trust is all this and much more. The
trust becomes operative only after a court has found, ei-
ther specifically or by inference, that it is charitable.
The state bestows privileges, of which tax immunity is
only one. It creates and defines charitable trusts, grants
them perpetual existence, modernizes them through the
cy pres doctrine, appoints and regulates the trustees, ap-
205 The failure to address this issue is even more surprising because there are many cases
in which the attorney general is an active party in litigation over what is to be done with a
discriminatory trust. See, e.g., Trammell v. Elliott, 199 S.E.2d 194, 197 (Ga. 1973) (involving
a situation in which the attorney general conceded state action in a case concerning a state
university). Cf Estate of Pruner, 136 A.2d 107, 110 (Pa. 1957) (holding that the attorney
general was an indispensable party to an action involving termination of a charitable trust).
But see Shapiro v. Columbia Union Nat'l Bank, 576 S.W.2d 310, 314 (Mo. 1978) (involving
an attorney general who moved to dismiss because there was no state action).
206 375 A.2d 998 (Conn. 1977), appeal after remand, 425 A.2d 909 (Conn. 1979).
207 Lockwood v. Killian, 375 A.2d at 1000.
208 The Connecticut Attorney General apparently approved of removal of the race and
gender restrictions and contended that the religion restriction should be eliminated as well. Id.
209 Lockwood v. Killian, 425 A.2d 909, 914 (Conn. 1979).
210 The court stated: "The Court did not create the religious restriction or independently
substitute it as a condition of eligibility. The Court merely applied neutral and non-discrimina-
tory principles of the doctrine of approximation in deleting two of the testator's restrictions
and leaving the third." Id. at 1003.
211 The court stated:
In the present case, the necessary participation in the action for instructions by the
attorney general, who does not seek to maintain the religuous restriction, and the
impartial application of the doctrine of approximation by the trial court, do not
amount to such significant state action within the purview of the [E]qual [P]rotection
[C]lause as will shift the responsibility for the testator's private discrimination to the
state.
id. at 1004.
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proves accounts, construes ambiguous language and
sometimes imposes a less stringent standard of tort lia-
bility on such trusts than on their private counterparts.
These are practical benefits, granted or withheld by ac-
tion of the state.
But state action does not end with the conferral of those
benefits. Accountability to somebody is required. Some
entity is needed to protect the public and bring the trus-
tee before the court for an accounting. All the states in
this country, either by statute or decision, have vested
that responsibility for enforcement in a governmental of-
ficial, usually the attorney general.
Accordingly, the administration of a charitable trust is
always characterized as state action.212
In my opinion, Justice Bogdanski's thoughtful dissent represents what
the law should be and what the law will probably become.
In Sweet Briar Institute v. Button,21 3 a federal district court enjoined
a commonwealth's attorney and the attorney general of Virginia from
enforcing the provisions of a trust requiring racial segregation in a col-
lege established by the trust. Although the decision in this case may be
correct, it is a peculiar decision with almost no reasoning.2 14 Citing the
Girard College case, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Board of Direc-
tors of City Trusts,215 the District Court held that enforcement of the trust
by the state would constitute prohibited state action. The Girard College
case is weak authority for the court's conclusion. In Girard College, the
board that operated the college was an agency of the commonwealth of
Pennsylvania and its administration of the trust was clearly government
action carried out through an administrative agency. In Sweet Briar In-
stitute, however, the college was operated by a private board and not by
212 Id. at 1006-07 (Bogdanski, J., dissenting). In support of his dissent, Justice Bogdan-
ski cited BOGERT, supra note 118, § 401, and Clark, supra 174.
213 280 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Va. 1967).
214 The district court in a previous decision abstained from deciding the issue because the
matter was still under consideration by the Virginia courts. After being directed by the U.S.
Supreme Court to decide the substantive issue, the court noted that its previous decision relat-
ing to its decision to abstain recited the history of the litigation. It then decided the substantive
issue in four cryptic sentences:
[W]e go immediately to the issue at hand: whether the State of Virginia may enforce
the provision in the will of the founder of the college restricting enrollment to "white
girls and young women."
We conclude it cannot .... This was the express holding in the Girard case, Com-
monwealth of Pennsylvania v. Bd. of Dirs. of City Trusts.
Sweet Briar Institute, 280 F.Supp. at 312 (citation omitted).
215 353 U.S. 989 (1957).
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an agency of the state. The Commonwealth of Virginia could act only
through its attorney general and commonwealth's attorney, quite a differ-
ent set of facts from those of the Girard College cases. I believe that the
conclusion of the court in Sweet Briar Institute is nonetheless correct for
the reasons outlined in this article. 216 However, the single snippet of
reasoning that the decision contains does not address the crucial ques-
tion: Is the enforcement of a discriminatory charitable trust prohibited
state action under the Equal Protection Clause?
Courts and attorneys general should examine the relationship of
states and charitable trusts. Examination of the involvement and respon-
sibility of attorneys general will show that the role of attorneys general is
extensive and goes well beyond simple regulation. They are responsible
for the effective management of these trusts and represent the public in
litigation involving them. Accordingly, courts and attorneys general
should decide that the activities and powers of attorneys general re-
present prohibited state action with respect to charitable trusts.
4. State Action Through Judicial Action - Shelley v. Kraemer
This section of the article discusses state action resulting from the
enforcement of discriminatory trusts by courts. As discussed above,
there is state action in the administrative supervision that attorneys gen-
eral exercise over charitable trusts. In addition to executive or legislative
action, states act through their courts.217 The judicial enforcement of
discriminatory private agreements is also prohibited state action under
the Supreme Court's reasoning in Shelley v. Kraemer.218
There is significant state involvement in the supervisory activities
over charitable trusts of both the attorneys general and of the courts. The
involvement of either the courts or of the attorneys general is sufficient
enough state action to render discriminatory charitable trusts invalid.
The fact that there is significant involvement of both attorneys general
and courts in charitable trust enforcement makes the case for invalidity
of discriminatory charitable trusts even more compelling.
216 The discriminatory provision in this case limited benefits to white females. The deci-
sions seem only concerned with the racial limitation and assume that the gender limitation
created no problems. As I outline in this article, I believe that race and gender should be
treated in the same manner with respect to the validity of discriminatory charitable trusts.
217 The Supreme Court has stated:
It is doubtless true that a State may act through different agencies - either by its
legislative, its executive, or its judicial authorities; and the prohibitions of the
amendment extend to all action of the State denying equal protection of the laws,
whether it be action by one of these agencies or by another.
Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 318 (1880).
218 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
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In Shelley v. Kraemer, the Supreme Court dealt with judicial en-
forcement of a racially restrictive covenant against occupancy of real es-
tate by blacks.219 The restrictive covenant was created by a group of
private property owners agreeing among themselves that their property
was not to be owned or occupied by "people of the Negro or Mongolian
Race."'220 Property subject to the restrictive covenant was sold to blacks,
and other property owners sought to judicially enforce the covenant. The
Court noted that the Fourteenth Amendment "erects no shield against
merely private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful. '22 1 The
Court stated:
[T]he restrictive agreements standing alone cannot be re-
garded as violative of any rights guaranteed to petition-
ers by the Fourteenth Amendment. So long as the
purposes of those agreements are effectuated by volun-
tary adherence to their terms, it would appear clear that
there has been no action by the State and the provisions
of the Amendment have not been violated.222
Having stated this, the Court went on to hold that the judicial enforce-
ment of the private restrictive covenant was prohibited state action.
22 3
Shelley v. Kraemer establishes the proposition that use of the courts
for enforcement of private race discrimination constitutes prohibited state
action. 224 Since the power of courts is often invoked to enforce charita-
ble trusts, the question arises whether judicial action enforcing charitable
trusts is prohibited state enforcement of race and sex discrimination
under its reasoning. Although the issue is fairly obvious, there are sur-
prisingly few case on this issue.
219 Id.
220 Id. at 5.
221 Id. at 13.
222 Id.
223 Id. at 23.
224 In Tulsa Professional Collection Services v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478 (1988), the Supreme
Court dealt with the issue of state action in the context of the Due Process Clause and notice to
estate creditors. In this case, Oklahoma had a statute requiring only notice by publication to
creditors of a decedent who had a claim against an estate. The issue was whether this was
deprivation of property by the state without adequate notice under the Due Process Clause. It
could only violate the Due Process Clause if the proceedings of the state probate court were
state action.
The Supreme Court held that since the probate court's appointment of the executor started
the time bar to claims against the estate, there was sufficient state involvement through the
court to constitute state action for Fourteenth Amendment due process purposes.
The court's involvement in charitable trusts, especially where the court is exercising its
powers of cy pres or equitable deviation, are more extensive than the powers exercised by the
court in Tulsa Professional Collection Services. Accordingly, the holding and the reasoning of
this case are consistent with the conclusion that the court's responsibilities with respect to
charitable trusts amounts to state action.
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The final Girard College case, Pennsylvania v. Brown,225 specifi-
cally dealt with whether the involvement of the court in removing state
officials from supervision of the trust constituted state action under the
reasoning of Shelley. The Third Circuit held that the replacement by the
Orphans' Court of the City of Philadelphia as trustee "demonstrates that
the Orphans' Court of Philadelphia County has been substantially in-
volved with the supervision of the Girard Estate. ' 22 6 The Third Circuit
further noted:
What the State Court did was to turn the matter over to
its Orphans' Court which eliminated the City as trustee
and installed its own group, sworn to uphold the literal
language of the Girard will, a move effectively continu-
ing the very segregation which had been condemned by
the United States Supreme Court.2 27
The Third Circuit affirmed a lower court injunction prohibiting
Girard College from excluding otherwise qualified applicants on the ba-
sis of race. The effect of Pennsylvania v. Brown was that the court used
its power to eliminate the race discrimination of a charitable trust, requir-
ing it to go forward on a constitutionally permitted non-discriminatory
basis, rather than allowing it to go forward as a discriminatory trust with-
out the involvement of the City of Philadelphia.
The New York Court of Appeals considered the issue in Estate of
Wilson,228 a case dealing with trusts that provided scholarships only to
males. Public officials participated in the selection of the scholarship
recipients.2 29 The involvement of the state officials in administering the
trusts clearly constituted prohibited state action. The question in the case
was how to remedy the prohibited state involvement in discrimination. 230
As in other cases of this sort, the court could have solved this prob-
lem by either eliminating the involvement of the public officials or by
eliminating the discriminatory provisions. The court chose to exercise its
powers of equitable deviation to modify the trust by eliminating the in-
volvement of the state officials, but leaving the discriminatory provisions
intact and the trusts otherwise unchanged.
After removing the participation of the state officials, the New York
Court of Appeals went on to consider whether the discriminatory nature
225 392 F.2d 120 (3d Cir. 1968); see discussion supra Part I.A.
226 Id. at 122.
227 Id. at 123. The court stated further that "[tihe Commonwealth's Orphans' Court,
through its assumed power of appointment and reappointment of the Trustees, is significantly
concerned with the current administration of the college." Id.
228 452 N.E.2d 1228 (N.Y. 1983); see discussion supra Part I.D.
229 Id. at 1231.
230 Id. at 1232.
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of the trust violated the Equal Protection Clause. The court held that
there was no state action because of the minimal involvement of the
state. After noting that private discrimination violates no constitutional
provisions and that the state is under no obligation to prevent purely pri-
vate discrimination, it concluded that the reasoning of Shelley v. Kraemer
did not make the court's involvement state action.23' It is difficult to
reconcile the holding of this case with that of Pennsylvania v. Brown.
The New York Court of Appeals held that the trusts were private
discriminatory trusts and that while the state regulated the trusts, "the
coercive power of the State has never been enlisted to enforce private
discrimination. '232 The court stated that "[t]his court holds only that a
trust's discriminatory terms are not fairly attributable to the State when a
court applies trust principles that permit private discrimination, but do
not encourage, affirmatively promote, or compel it. ' 233
The court in Estate of Wilson appears to have misapplied the rea-
soning of Shelley v. Kraemer. The power, involvement, and discretion of
courts in discriminatory charitable trusts is even broader than those that
were involved in Shelley v. Kraemer. In Shelley, the state court had only
the power to enforce the discriminatory covenants or to refuse to enforce
them as unconstitutional. The power to enforce the covenants consti-
tuted state action, according to the Supreme Court. In discriminatory
charitable trusts such as those in Estate of Wilson, the courts also have
additional powers. As in Shelly v. Kraemer, the courts can enforce the
discriminatory agreement or refuse to enforce it on constitutional
grounds.
However, the courts have two substantial additional powers with
respect to charitable trusts. First, the courts in both charitable and private
trusts have the power essentially to revise the administrative provisions
of the trust instrument through the doctrine of equitable deviation if the
trust cannot be administered as written. 234 The court in Estate of Wilson
exercised this power to revise the trusts by removing the state officials
from administration of the trusts. The court had exercised this power to
231 Id. at 1236.
232 Id. at 1237. In support of this conclusion, the Court of Appeals cited the U.S. Su-
preme Court cases of Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978), and Evans v. Abney, 396
U.S. 435 (1970) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
233 Estate of Wilson, 452 N.E.2d at 1237.
234 The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 381 (1959) provides:
The court will direct or permit the trustee of a charitable trust to deviate from a term
of the trust if it appears to the court that compliance is impossible or illegal, or that
owing to circumstances not known to the settlor and not anticipated by him compli-
ance would defeat or substantially impair the accomplishment of the purposes of the
trust.
An essentially identical rule applies to noncharitable trusts. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TRUSTS § 167.
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remove a trustee and replace it with another trustee and to revise the
selection process for scholarships. The power to revise the administra-
tion of the trusts and to appoint a new trustee is significant and greater
than the powers of the courts in Shelley.
Second, courts in charitable trusts have the power of cy pres. Cy
pres allows courts to revise the actual purposes of charitable trusts when
the original purposes become impossible or impractical. 235 This again is
an important power that the courts did not have in Shelley. Some courts
have used their cy pres powers, as well as their equitable deviation pow-
ers, to remove the discriminatory provisions from charitable trusts. 236
Accordingly, the court in Estate of Wilson had essentially the same
powers that the U.S. Supreme Court in Shelley held to be sufficient to
create prohibited state action. In addition, the courts in Estate of Wilson
and in all charitable trusts have sweeping additional powers through eq-
uitable deviation and cy pres to restructure the administration and opera-
tion of the charitable trusts. The argument that there was state action
through judicial enforcement was more compelling in Estate of Wilson
than it was in Shelley,237 notwithstanding the conclusion of the New
York Court of Appeals.
235 The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 399 provides:
If property is given in trust to be applied to a particular charitable purpose, and it is
or becomes impossible or impracticable or illegal to carry out the particular purpose,
and if the settlor manifested a more general intention to devote the property to chari-
table purposes, the trust will not fail but the court will direct the application of the
property to some charitable purpose which falls within the general charitable inten-
tion of the settlor.
236 See United States v. Hughes Mem'l Home, 396 F. Supp. 544 (W.D. Va. 1975) (using
cy pres to eliminate a racial restrictions trust that operated a children's home), and Coffee v.
Rice Univ., 408 S.W.2d 269 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) (using cy pres and equitable deviation to
eliminate racial restrictions of a university). See also Mark Petrucci, The Cy Pres Doctrine -
Is It State Action?, 18 CAP. U. L. REV. 383 (1989) (concluding that judicial modification of
charitable trusts through use of cy pres is prohibited state action), and Richelle E. Searing,
Note, Discriminatory Charitable Trusts: The Rule of Approximation and the Fourteenth
Amendment, 4 CONN. PROB. L.J. 279 (1989) (discussing judicial modification of charitable
trusts as state action).
Kathryn F. Voyer suggests that discriminatory private trusts violate both public policy
and the Constitution and should not be enforced. Voyer, supra note 174. While this conclu-
sion is far beyond what the courts are willing to hold presently, it is not illogical. Although
there is much less public involvement in private trusts than in charitable trusts, the courts do
have significant involvement in private trusts that could be characterized as state action.
237 In re Will of Fuller, 636 N.E.2d 1333 (Mass. 1994), illustrates the extent of the power
of the courts to supervise charitable trusts. In this case the attorney general, exercising his
statutory powers of supervision over charitable trusts, settled with testamentary trustees in a
controversy involving depletion of trust assets. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
held that the settlement with the attorney general did not deprive the Probate and Family Court
of the power to require the trustees to account to the court for their management of the trust.
This case illustrates the broad scope of judicial power to supervise charitable trusts, as well as
the parallel power of the attorney general to supervise these trusts.
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We need simply to look at the results of Estate of Wilson to see the
depth of the power and involvement of the courts in charitable trusts.
The Court of Appeals made significant decisions about the structure and
operation of the trusts that showed judicial involvement and discretion
far beyond the involvement in Shelley. The Court of Appeals had the
power to enforce the trusts as written. It had the power to hold them
unenforceable as discriminatory state action. It had the power of equita-
ble deviation to revise, as it did, the administrative provisions and to
remove the trustee. It had the power, which it chose not to exercise, to
use cy pres to change the trust and remove the discriminatory provisions.
With all of these options available to it, the Court of Appeals chose a
course of action that preserved the discriminatory nature of the trusts.
This was a more persuasive case for state action through the courts than
the facts in Shelley.
In contrast, in In re Certain Scholarship Funds,238 the Supreme
Court of New Hampshire reached a different conclusion in a case involv-
ing a scholarship that was to be awarded to Protestant boys who were
recommended by the high school principal and approved by the Board of
Education. The New Hampshire court relied primarily on the state equal
protection clause and cy pres statute in affirming a decision that removed
the discriminatory provisions, 239 rather than removing the state officials
from decision-making. Although the general applicability of the decision
is limited by the reliance on New Hampshire law, Certain Scholarship
Funds is a clear holding that it would be state action for the court to
remove the state administrators and allow the discrimination to con-
tinue. 240 Despite the importance of the issue, Estate of Wilson and Cer-
tain Scholarship Funds seem to be the only cases that have seriously
addressed the question of court involvement in administering discrimina-
tory trusts. Accordingly, we have no clear trend in the cases on this
issue.
Courts play a more significant role in the operation of charitable
trusts than they do in other arrangements. They have the power to
change the purposes and operation of trusts through cy pres and equitable
deviation and general equitable power to supervise trusts. These powers
involve the courts, and through the courts, the state in the management of
these trusts.
238 575 A.2d 1325 (N.H. 1990); see discussion supra at Part I.D.
239 The terms "boy" and "protestant boy" were replaced with "student." Id. at 1328.
240 In addition, the New Hampshire court stated that the "court's powers to appoint or
reappoint a trustee in those cases where the trust involved is, and has been from its inception, a
privately administered lawful discriminatory trust, does not rise to the same level of State
involvement so as to be considered significant." Id. at 1329.
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CONCLUSION
Charitable trusts that discriminate on the basis of race or gender
should not be enforced. 241 First, race and gender discrimination is con-
trary to our public policy, and therefore these trusts are contrary to the
common law trust principle prohibiting enforcement of trusts that violate
public policy. Second, these trusts should not be enforced because en-
forcement violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The state involvement necessary to trigger the Equal Pro-
tection Clause exists in two separate aspects of charitable trusts. There is
state action because of the significant role of states' attorneys general in
the supervision and administration of charitable trusts. There is also state
action in the involvement of the courts in the supervision and operation
of courts.
Ultimately, the unenforceability of discriminatory charitable trusts
rests on the public nature of these trusts. Their purpose is to benefit the
public and they are given favorable tax treatment and exempted from the
rule against perpetuities and other rules because of their public nature.
Because they are public entities, the law requires substantial involvement
of both the attorney general and the courts.
Our courts have ceased to enforce racially discriminatory charitable
trusts but stop short of declaring that these trusts are always unenforce-
able. The Supreme Court has held that discriminatory trusts are not char-
itable for tax purposes. It is time for the courts generally to acknowledge
that racially discriminatory trusts are never enforceable under our current
law. They should recognize that the reasons for making racially discrim-
inatory trusts unenforceable also apply to gender discriminatory trusts,
and thus gender discriminatory trusts are unenforceable.
241 As with the state law public policy doctrine, the Equal Protection Clause would not
prohibit enforcement of all charitable trusts that had disparate impact on different racial
groups. The Constitution would only deny enforcement to charitable trusts that have the pur-
pose of excluding racial or gender groups from their benefits. For example, in Lockwood v.
Killian, 375 A.2d 998 (Conn. 1977), the trust in question provided benefits only for Caucasian
boys who were members of the "Protestant Congregational Faith." Id. at 1000. The Supreme
Court of Connecticut invalidated the race and gender restrictions but allowed the religion re-
striction to remain. Id. at 1005 (Bogdanski, J., dissenting). Such a trust shows that one of the
purposes of the trust is to exclude non-white and female students from its benefits.
On the other hand, a trust that provided scholarships to students who graduated from a
particular high school would be enforceable, even if there were few female or non-white stu-
dents at the high school. However, this trust would not be enforced if there were other evi-
dence that the purpose of the trust was to discriminate. The Supreme Court has concluded that
state action having a disproportionate impact on racial or gender groups does not violate the
Constitution unless the purpose of the state action is to discriminate. Washington v. Davis,
426 U.S. 229 (1976). Accordingly, charitable trusts for the members of a particular church or
the residents of a particular community would be enforceable, provided that there was no other
evidence of a discriminatory purpose.
